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THE SURPRISING LESSONS FROM PLEA
BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF TERROR
Lucian E. Dervan∗∇
ABSTRACT
Since September 11, 2001, several hundred individuals have been
convicted of terrorism related charges. Of these convictions, over
80% resulted from a plea of guilty. It is surprising and
counterintuitive that such a large percentage of these cases are
resolved in this manner, yet, even when prosecuting suspected
terrorists caught attempting suicide attacks, the power of the plea
bargaining machine exerts a striking influence. As a result, a close
examination of these extraordinary cases offers important insights
into the forces that drive the plea bargaining system. Utilizing these
insights, this article critiques two divergent and dominant theories of
plea bargaining present in the current literature—the administrative
theory and the shadow-of-trial theory. The article then offers a new
theory of plea bargaining that both expands on these existing theories
and combines relevant aspects of each into one overarching model. In
doing so, this article provides for a greater understanding of the
function of the plea bargaining machine in the criminal justice
process, the roles played by its actors, and the factors influencing its
operation.
INTRODUCTION
An hour and a half from Paris, American Airlines Flight 63 cruised
39,000 feet above the Atlantic Ocean. Inside, protected from the
negative 70 degree temperatures outside the steel fuselage, sat 183
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, and former member of
the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and Government Investigations Team.
∇ A special thanks to Professors Marc Miller, Ellen Podgor, Mark Brown, William Schroeder, and
Christopher Behan for their insightful comments regarding earlier drafts of this article. This article is
dedicated to Dalton, who arrived just as I was completing this piece.
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passengers, many of whom had already drifted off to sleep. In row
twenty-nine, however, a tall, unkempt man sat restlessly, his mind
likely full of thoughts of both the past that had brought him to this
place and the task that lay ahead. He had attempted to board the same
flight the day before, but the fact that he had paid cash for his ticket
and was carrying no checked luggage so concerned authorities at
Charles de Gaulle Airport that they detained him for interrogation
until well after the first flight to Miami departed. Now, a mere
twenty-four hours later, he was in his desired perch, his message to
the world concealed within the soles of his high-top basketball
shoes.1
The first scream jolted Thierry Dugeon from his deep sleep in row
thirty-nine, the air already ripe with the smell of sulfur. As his eyes
adjusted to the scene, he saw the man in front of him fighting off a
flight attendant who was grasping for his feet and screaming, “I need
some help, I need some help.”2 As Dugeon lunged forward and
restrained the man’s arms, five other passengers and crewmembers
raced toward them and tackled the stranger. As belts were passed
down the rows to create restraints, the man’s shoes, which were
smoldering, were dowsed with water.3 Once restrained, a doctor
injected the enraged passenger with a sedative, and the plane fell
silent. A short while later, outside in the frigid air, two F-15 fighter
jets rose out of the dark sky and guided the plane safely to Boston’s
Logan Airport.4
1. See Pam Belluck, Crew Grabs Man; Explosive Feared, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at A1; Dana
Canedy, A Nation Challenged: The Travelers; A “Strange” Traveler Acted, and the Passengers Reacted,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2001, at A1; Michael Elliott, The Shoe Bomber’s World, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, at
46, available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1001865,00.html.
2. Belluck, supra note 1.
3. The above described events are eerily similar to the attempted terrorist attack on Northwest
Flight 253 in December 2009 by the “Christmas Day Bomber.” In a similar style to Richard Reid, Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab slipped through airport security by hiding his bomb materials in his underwear.
Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1 (noting the similarities between the “Christmas Day Bomber” and the
“Shoe Bomber”); see also Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff & Evan Thomas, The Radicalization of
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, at 37; Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man is
Indicted in Attempted Plan Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A14. It is as of yet unknown whether
Abdulmutallab will plead guilty to his alleged act of terrorism, but the observations and analysis offered
in this article will shed considerable light on the likelihood that he will bypass trial in return for a plea.
4. Belluck, supra note 1; Canedy, supra note 1.
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Less than a year later, on October 4, 2002, that tall, unkempt man,
Richard Reid, pleaded guilty to eight felony charges, but received no
leniency from the prosecution. The charges included attempted
murder, attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, and
attempted destruction of an aircraft.5 It is puzzling that a man who
spent years training in Afghanistan and traveling the world for al
Qaeda scouting for vulnerable targets would choose to plead guilty in
a court whose legitimacy he refused even to recognize.6 Though Reid
had certainly not lost his fervor for al Qaeda, something stronger than
his hatred of America prompted his decision to plead guilty, and Reid
is certainly not the only terrorist to so acquiesce.
Obtaining the exact number of defendants who have pleaded guilty
to terrorism or terrorism related charges since September 11, 2001 is
impossible because the federal government refuses to release such
information. It is estimated though that there have been several
hundred convictions of which over 80% resulted from a plea of
guilty.7 Although the plea rate for terrorism cases is certainly lower
than the plea rate for other federal offenses, which on average has
remained above 95% for almost every year since 1999, a plea rate in
excess of 80% is remarkably high given the psyche of those who
engage in the acts being prosecuted.8 Consider that Richard Reid
5. See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1, U.S. v. Richard Colvin Reid, CR NO. 0210013-WGY (D. Mass. Jan. 17, 2003) (containing the government’s arguments as to why Richard Reid
should be sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison).
6. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 49 (detailing Reid’s travels to France, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan prior to his attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight 63).
7. While the federal government has previously released both criminal prosecution data and
sentencing data through both the United States Sentencing Commission and Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), information related to terrorism prosecutions has not been made public
through these forums. In 2006, however, the Department of Justice released a Counterterrorism White
Paper, which stated that since 2001 there had been 261 terrorism convictions in 45 jurisdictions, of
which 83% were the result of a plea bargain. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE
PAPER 13–14 (June 22, 2006). Also in 2006, The Center on Law and Security released a study that
estimated there had been 307 terrorism convictions since 2001, of which 82% were the result of a plea
bargain. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TERRORISM TRIAL REPORT CARD: U.S. EDITION 4 (2006), available at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRCComplete.pdf; see also Richard Schmitt, For the
Justice Department, a Welcome Conviction, LA TIMES, at A15, Apr. 26, 2006 (“[M]ost of the
convictions the Justice Department has won since the Sept. 11 attacks have come by defendants pleading
guilty to crimes rather than by the government proving its case in a court of law.”).
8. Lucian E. Dervan, Plea Bargaining’s Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, a Continued
Triumph in a Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 476 (Fall 2007).
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rejected the authority of the American justice system and expressed
his continued allegiance to al Qaeda only moments before subjecting
himself to the judgment of a United States district court judge.
While it may be counterintuitive that such a large percentage of
terrorism prosecutions are resolved through plea bargains, it appears
that even in these extraordinary cases the power of the plea
bargaining machine exerts a striking influence. As a result, a close
examination of these extraordinary cases offers important insights
into the forces that drive the plea bargaining system. Utilizing these
insights, this article will critique two divergent and dominant theories
of plea bargaining in the current literature and offer a modified theory
that harmonizes the conflict between these two perspectives.
In Section I, this article examines the history of plea bargaining
and the two theories which dominate the current literature.9 The first
theory, the administrative theory, argues that plea bargaining
triumphed because of the rise of prosecutorial power.10 Such
literature argues that prosecutors have become so powerful due to
their control of charging decisions and sentencing ranges that they
now force defendants to accept plea bargains for which they alone
have determined the appropriate punishment in an administrative
fashion. The second theory, the shadow-of-trial theory, argues that
both prosecutors and defendants participate in the plea bargaining
process and engage in a mutually beneficial contractual negotiation.11
In this model, each party forecasts the expected sentence after trial
and the probability of acquittal. The parties then come to a resolution
that contains some related proportional discount.
In Section II, the article examines three terrorism prosecutions and
furthers our understanding of the plea bargaining machine by
discussing three features of these cases.12 The first feature is that
defendants sometimes determine that the inherent benefits of
pleading guilty, even without an offer of additional benefits from the
government, are a sufficient incentive to forego trial. In these cases,
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part I (regarding conflicting theories of plea bargaining).
See infra Part I.A (describing the “administrative theory” of plea bargaining).
See infra Part I.B (describing the “shadow-of-trial theory” of plea bargaining).
See infra Part II (describing the Richard Reid, Lodi, California, and Lackawanna Six cases).
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the plea bargain is with the criminal justice system itself and not the
government, yet it is a plea bargain nonetheless because a guilty plea
is exchanged for perceived benefits. The second feature is that
defendants, as well as prosecutors, exercise considerable control over
the factors that influence decisions regarding whether a guilty plea
will be entered and what, if any, leniency will be offered in return.
Some of these factors are present in all criminal cases, some are
applicable in each type of criminal charge, and some are unique to
particular defendants. By demonstrating the significant role played by
defendants in the system, this article will challenge the contention of
the administrative theory that defendants are unwilling participants in
the plea bargaining machine and unable to exercise real influence
over the outcome of the process. The third feature is that after both
parties have influenced the factors that affect the prosecution’s and
the defense’s analysis of the barriers to success at trial and the
barriers to success of the plea bargain, the prosecution makes a final
administrative decision regarding the appropriate punishment. In
more than 80% of terrorism cases and 95% of federal prosecutions,
the defendant then accepts the government’s offer.
In Section III, building upon the aspects of the plea bargaining
machine examined in Section II, this article will propose a new
theory of plea bargaining that both expands on the administrative and
shadow-of-trial theories and combines relevant aspects of each into
one overarching theory of plea bargaining.13 Through such an
analysis, one will gain a greater understanding of the function of the
plea bargaining machine in the criminal justice process, the roles
played by its actors, and the factors influencing its operation.
I. CONFLICTING THEORIES REGARDING THE PLEA BARGAINING
MACHINE
While plea bargaining pre-dates the American criminal justice
system, “its evolution into a force that consumes over 95% of
defendants in America is a phenomenon confined predominately to
13. See infra Part III (examining the dual chambers of the plea bargaining machine).
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”14 George Fisher begins his
seminal work on plea bargaining, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, with a
somber expression of remorse over the machine’s rise to prominence:
“There is no glory in plea bargaining. In place of a noble clash for
truth, plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce. . . . But though its
victory merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed. . . . The
battle has been lost for some time. . . . Victory goes to the
powerful.”15 While the battle may have been lost for some time,
understanding the evolution and future of plea bargaining remains a
challenging endeavor.
As alluded to in Fisher’s statement above, a general consensus has
evolved within plea bargaining scholarship that plea bargaining
became a dominant force as a result of prosecutors gaining increasing
power and control in an ever more complex criminal justice system.
As prosecutors’ powers to operate within and manipulate the system
grew, their ability to create incentives for defendants to plead guilty
also escalated. For instance, through analysis of plea bargaining in
Massachusetts, Fisher argues that as the criminal justice system
became more sophisticated, prosecutors gained the power to use
selective charge bargaining to offer reduced sentences for those
willing to negotiate.16
14. Dervan, supra note 8, at 478.
15. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA
1 (2003) (emphasis added); see also George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859
(2000). For a discussion of scholarship on plea bargaining generally and the debate over whether plea
bargaining is an appropriate part of our criminal justice system, see Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched
Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006).
16. FISHER, supra note 15, at 210 (“[Sentencing Guidelines] invest prosecutors with the power,
moderated only by the risk of loss at trial, to dictate many sentences simply by choosing one set of
charges over another.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 40 (1979); Dervan, supra note 8, at 478. For a discussion of charge bargaining and its use by
prosecutors, see Joy A. Boyd, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice’s Plea Bargain
Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor’s Power Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 56
ALA. L. REV. 591, 592 (2004) (“Not only may a prosecutor choose whether to pursue any given case,
but she also decides which charges to file.”); Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating
Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67 (2006) (“Like most plea agreements in federal or state courts, the standard
D.C. federal plea agreement starts by identifying the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty
and the charges or potential charges that the government in exchange agrees not to prosecute.”); Dervan,
supra note 8, at 478; Jon J. Lambiras, White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite
Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 512 (2003) (“Charging decisions are a critical sentencing
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Key to the success of prosecutors’ use of increasing powers to
create incentives that attracted defendants was their ability to
structure plea agreements that included significant differences
between the sentence one received in return for pleading guilty and
the sentence one risked if he or she lost at trial.17 In a 1981 article on
plea bargaining, Albert Alschuler wrote of this “sentencing
differential” and stated, “Criminal defendants today plead guilty in
overwhelming numbers primarily because they perceive that this
action is likely to lead to more lenient treatment than would follow
conviction at trial. A number of studies suggest that this perception is
justified.”18 Among such studies was an examination by David
Brereton and Jonathan Casper that analyzed robbery and burglary
defendants in three California jurisdictions.19 The results were
shocking and illustrated that defendants who exercised their
constitutional right to a trial received significantly higher sentences
than those who worked with prosecutors to reach an agreement.20 Not
matter and are left solely to the discretion of the prosecutor. When determining which charges to bring,
prosecutors may often choose from more than one statutory offense.”); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the
Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 177 (2004) (“The power of the prosecutor to charge is
two-fold; the power to indict or not . . . and the power to decide what offenses to charge.”).
17. Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1425, 1425 (2002) [hereinafter Bibas, Bringing Moral Values] (“The criminal justice system uses
large sentence discounts to induce guilty pleas. Of course these discounts exert pressure on defendants to
plead guilty.”). Along with sentencing differentials, of course, are considerations by the defendant of the
likelihood of success at trial. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Shadow of Trial] (“In short, the classic shadow-oftrial model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely
determine plea bargains.”).
18. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 652–53
(1981). Alschuler goes on to state, “Although the empirical evidence is not of one piece, the best
conclusion probably is that in a great many cases the sentence differential in America assumes shocking
proportions.” Id. at 654–56; see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea
Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 251 (2006) (“While practitioners disagree
about the acceptability of a large sentence differential between the post-plea and post-trial sentence, they
agree that such a differential is common.”).
19. David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and
the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 55–59 (1981–82); accord H. Joo Shin,
Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing and Parole Process, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27
(1973) (finding that charge reduction directly results in reduction of the maximum sentence available
and indirectly results in lesser actual time served).
20. Brereton & Casper, supra note 19, at 55–59; accord Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of
Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (2000)
(“The differential in sentencing between those who plead and those convicted after trial reflects the
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limiting themselves to a mere observation of sentencing trends, the
researchers also made an insightful statement regarding the impact of
high differentials on the rates of plea bargaining:
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when
guilty plea rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing.
We believe that recent arguments to the effect that differentials
are largely illusory do not withstand serious scrutiny, even
though this revisionist challenge has been valuable in forcing us
to examine more closely what is too often taken to be self21
evidently true.

Significant differentials, Brereton and Casper argued, are a tool
used to increase plea bargaining rates by increasing the incentives for
negotiation.22
A. The Administrative Theory of Plea Bargaining
The scholarship described above regarding the rise of plea
bargaining has led to a theory pertaining to the modern operation of
the plea bargaining machine. This theory emphasizes the role of the
prosecution in dictating the terms and conditions of the bargain and
relegates the defendant to the position of an unwilling, passive
participant whose only power rests in the ability to accept or reject
the government’s offer. This article will entitle this model the
administrative theory of plea bargaining because at its most
judgment that defendants who insist upon a trial are doing something blameworthy.”); Tung Yin, Not a
Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the
Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 443 (1995) (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the
concepts of duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more
likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit offered in
exchange for the guilty plea.”).
21. Brereton & Casper, supra note 19, at 69.
22. Id. at 45 (“It is this sentence differential (whether conceived of as a reward to guilty pleaders or
as a punishment of those who waste the court’s time by ‘needless’ trials) which has traditionally been
seen as the engine driving the plea-bargaining assembly line.”); see also Givelber, supra note 20, at
1382 (“The pragmatic justification for differential sentencing is simple and powerful: we want those
charged with crimes to plead guilty, and differential sentencing provides an accused with a strong
incentive to do just that.”).
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pronounced, the theory portrays prosecutors as administrative figures
handing down punishment in the place of the courts.23
Fisher alludes to the idea of prosecutors as the ultimate wielders of
an administrative type decision-making power in his work Plea
Bargaining’s Triumph:
To track the course of plea bargaining’s rise, we must discover
how prosecutors, who had an almost inherent interest in plea
bargaining, secured the power to make it happen, and why
judges, who inherently had the power to make it happen, began
to see it as in their interest. . . . And criminal defendants, who
held a nominally absolute power to plead or not to plead but who
found themselves hopelessly undefended, must play a real if
24
complicated part.

A more conscious description of defendants as passive players is
contained in Donald Gifford’s 1983 work entitled Meaningful Reform
of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion.25
Gifford begins his piece by casting defendants as mere recipients of
the government’s administrative verdicts in the form of plea offers:
[P]lea bargains are not consensual agreements entered into by
defendants after adversarial negotiation. Rather, the prosecutor
substantially dictates the terms of plea agreements in most cases.
“Plea bargaining” is in reality the prosecutor’s unilateral
administrative determination of the level of the defendant’s
26
criminal culpability and the appropriate punishment for him.

23. It is worthy of mention that the description regarding the administrative and shadow-of-trial
theories presented in this article utilizes several strong pieces that establish the outer poles of this debate.
While many other articles may fall, sometimes unknowingly, somewhere between these two extremes,
this article seeks to definitively address the conflict present in the literature and resolve the inherent
discrepancies between the two opposing theories.
24. FISHER, supra note 15, at 859 (emphasis added).
25. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983).
26. Id. at 39 (“In reality, there is little of the ‘give-and-take’ which is axiomatic to the Supreme
Court’s treatment of plea bargaining.”); Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on Case-Management Criminal
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For defendants in the administrative theory, therefore, there is no
significant role other than what Fisher termed two decades later the
“nominally absolute power” to accept the government’s offer.27
Gifford even uses the term “administrative determination” in
describing the government’s role in the plea bargaining machine.28
This view of the parties’ roles in plea bargaining is also discussed by
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, who state in their piece entitled
Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains that the “American
criminal justice systems have become administrative systems run by
executive-branch officials.”29 As applied to the plea bargaining
process, Wright and Miller state, “Guilty pleas could just as easily
reflect prosecutorial domination and an administrative system run
amok.”30
In his article entitled Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice,
Michael M. O’Hear argues that the modern plea bargaining process is
essentially administrative in nature.31 O’Hear rejects the notion that
plea bargains result from a form of contractual negotiation involving
two participating parties:
Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 571, 605 (2004) (“Prosecutors already wield nearly absolute power in the
criminal arena and exert that power in the plea bargaining setting.”); see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to
do is a due process violation of the most basic sort . . . and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of
action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently
unconstitutional’. . . . But in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of
punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”)
(citations omitted); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 50, 54 (1968) (“Administrative considerations are far more basic. ‘We are running a machine,’ a
Los Angeles trial assistant declares. ‘We know we have to grind them out fast.’”).
27. FISHER, supra note 15, at 859.
28. Gifford, supra note 25, at 45 (“[T]he process of determining what charges the defendant will
plead to is more an administrative determination than a true negotiation.”).
29. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1409, 1409 (2003).
30. Id. at 1415; see also Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2037 (2006) (“The enormous power of federal prosecutors to
persuade suspects to accept guilty pleas is well documented.”); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2123 (1998) (“The substantive evaluation of the
evidence and assessment of the defendant’s responsibility is not made in court at all, but within the
executive branch, in the office of the prosecutor.”); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box,
94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 137 (2008) (“Many scholars have observed that our criminal justice system today
is more administrative than adversarial . . . . [Rather than trials assessing evidence,] the meaningful
screening of cases now may be prosecutorial rather than judicial.”).
31. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008).
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Moreover, it is easy to overstate the extent to which plea
bargaining really is bargaining. As noted previously, the practice
often resembles shopping in a supermarket—with one important
exception: the dissatisfied defendant is not free to move on to a
different store in search of lower prices. . . . [W]hen
prosecutorial lenience is the only reliable means to avoid a
draconian sentence, the prosecutor can effectively dictate the
32
terms of the “deal.”

Even Justice David H. Souter has argued that defendants in plea
negotiations often stand in no position to dictate the terms of the deal.
In his dissent in United States v. Mezzanatto, he wrote, with regard to
waivers of appeal in plea agreements, that defendants are “generally
in no position to challenge demands for these waivers, and the use of
waiver provisions as contracts of adhesion has become accepted
practice.”33
Taken to the extreme, the administrative plea bargaining theory
argues that prosecutors have become so powerful that defendants
have even lost what Fisher termed the “nominally absolute power to
plead or not to plead.”34 Such an argument was advanced by John
Langbein in describing plea bargaining as a form of torture and the
defendants as unwilling victims of coercive incentives:
We coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to
confess his guilt. To be sure, our means are much politer; we use
no rack, no thumbscrew, no Spanish boot to mash his legs. But
like the Europeans of distant centuries who did employ those
machines, we make it terribly costly for an accused to claim his

32. Id. at 425; see also David Aaron, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor’s
Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3035–36 (1999) (“[T]he
coercive power of the prosecutor and the general disequilibrium between the government and the
defendant challenge the assertion that a plea bargain is a voluntary agreement or contract.”).
33. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995); see also Robert Elias, The Law of
Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber’s Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of
Victims’ Rights, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 240–41 (2004) (book review) (“While it promotes efficiency, it
rarely produces any bargain and typically amounts to an unconditional surrender.”).
34. FISHER, supra note 15, at 859.
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right to the constitutional safeguard of trial. We threaten him
with a materially increased sanction if he avails himself of his
right and is thereafter convicted. This sentencing differential is
what makes plea bargaining coercive. There is, of course, a
difference between having your limbs crushed if you refuse to
confess, or suffering some extra years of imprisonment if you
refuse to confess, but the difference is of degree, not kind. Plea
35
bargaining, like torture, is coercive.

Under this account, the plea bargaining machine is a torturous
contraption into which no defendant would willingly step, yet
defendants are forced to accept the government’s offer because they
are powerless to influence the bargain and risk too much by
proceeding to trial.36
B. The Shadow-of-Trial Theory of Plea Bargaining
The administrative plea bargaining theory, however, is not the only
methodology currently being debated in plea bargaining scholarship.
Another line of scholarship has evolved describing more balanced
roles for the prosecution and the defense in the plea bargaining
machine. This theory has been termed the shadow-of-trial plea
bargaining theory.37
35. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (1978); see also
David T. Johnson, American Law in Japanese Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 778–79
(2003) (In discussing plea bargaining, which Kagan describes as “adversarial legalism’s ugly child,”
Johnson states, “I am no fan of plea bargaining. It tortures the truth, coerces defendants, undermines
consistency, generates injustice, and concentrates enormous power—to charge, try, and sentence—in the
prosecutor’s hands.”).
36. While less extreme, Donald Gifford wrote of the coercive nature of plea bargaining in his article
entitled Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, stating, “The
sentencing differential between defendants who are convicted at trial and those who accept the
prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty is so pervasive and so substantial that few defendants are foolhardy
enough to risk testing the prosecutor’s determination of the ‘value’ of their case.” Gifford, supra note
25, at 46.
37. Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH & LEE L.
REV. 73, 74 (2009) (“The dominant theoretical model of plea bargaining—so-called ‘trial shadow
theory’—predicts that, once charged, innocent and guilty persons alike almost always act rationally by
pleading guilty rather than contesting guilt at trial.”); see HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 31–32 (Little, Brown & Company Limited) (1966) (“At every stage of this informal
process of pre-trial dispositions . . . decisions are in part informed by expectations of what the jury will
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In their 1992 article entitled Plea Bargaining as Contract, Robert
E. Scott and William J. Stuntz argue that plea bargaining’s durability
rests on the fact that parties can and will reach mutually beneficial
agreements:
Criminal trials are costly for defendants, and even more so for
prosecutors. These costs can be saved, and the gains split
between the parties, by reaching a bargain early in the criminal
process. Consequently, in cases where both parties understand
that conviction at trial is virtually certain—a description that fits
many, many cases—the incentive to bargain is simple. Savings in
38
adjudication costs represent the gains from trade.

With regard to cases in which the likelihood of conviction is less
certain, Scott and Stuntz conclude that the bargained for agreement
will be “based upon the prosecutor’s estimate of the strength of the
case at the time of bargaining plus the expected savings in transaction
costs from shifting prosecutorial efforts to pleas rather than trials.”39
In all criminal cases, therefore, the plea bargain represents a contract
negotiated by both parties that largely reflects the likelihood of

do. Thus, the jury is not controlling merely the immediate case . . . , but the host of cases . . . which are
destined to be disposed of by the pre-trial process.”); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain
Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 512–14, 523 (1979); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Bargaining as Compromise];
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309–17 (1983)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Market System]; Edward A. Ruttenburg, Plea Bargaining Analytically—The
Nash Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 353 (1979); William M. Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66–69 (1971); Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992); see also Candace Zierdt &
Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policy, 96
KY. L.J. 1 (2007) (examining corporate deferred prosecutions agreements through contract policing
theories).
38. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1935 (emphasis added); see also Gabriel Hallevy, The Defense
Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 495, 497 (2009) (“In a plea bargain,
the power to determine the fate of the case is passed on to the parties who set out its terms in a
contractual agreement. Within the framework of a plea bargain, it is possible for the parties to reach
agreement regarding every detail connected with the criminal proceedings that is within their power to
determine.”).
39. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1948.
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conviction at trial and the likely sentence resulting from such
conviction.40
In his 2004 article entitled Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, Stephanos Bibas expands on this theory of plea bargaining, but
does not reject the role of the defendant in the process.41 Instead,
Bibas argues that the shadow-of-trial theory should be expanded to
account for additional factors that influence the contractual
negotiation between the parties beyond merely the likelihood of
success:42
First, there are many structural impediments that distort
bargaining in various cases. Poor lawyering, agency costs, and
lawyers’ self interest are prime examples, as are bail rules and
pretrial detention. The structural skewing of bargains has grown
in the last two decades with the proliferation of mandatory
sentences and sentencing guidelines. . . . Second, the shadow-oftrial model assumes that the actors are fundamentally rational.
Recent scholarship on negotiation and behavioral law and
economics, however, undercuts this strong assumption of
40. Under the shadow-of-trial theory, therefore, there are three fundamental questions that dictate the
terms of the bargained for agreement:
(1) The trial sentence anticipated if the case were tried and resulted in a conviction;
(2) The likelihood that a trial will result in a conviction; and
(3) The resource costs of trying the case.
According to one author, “Assuming that prosecutors seek to maximize and defendants seek to minimize
sentences, the price of any plea should be the product of the anticipated trial sentence and the likelihood
of conviction, discounted by some factor to reflect the resources saved by not having to try the case.”
Covey, supra note 37, at 77–78; see also Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66
(“Proponents of the shadow-of-trial model do not deny that factors other than the merits influence
settlements at the margins . . . . By and large, though, scholars view the shadow of trial as the
overwhelming determinant of plea bargaining. Implicitly, they treat other factors as minor refinements
to a basically sound model.”).
41. See Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2464; see also Russell Covey, Reconsidering the
Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 215 (2007)
(“Some of the pioneering work in this area—by Professor Bibas and others—accepts plea bargaining as
a given and examines the impact that cognitive bias has on the bargaining decisions made by prosecutors
and defendants. That work concludes that cognitive bias sometimes impedes defendants from accepting
utility-enhancing plea offers and less frequently induces defendants to accept utility-diminishing plea
bargains.”).
42. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465 (“By and large . . . scholars view the shadow of
trial as the overwhelming determinant of plea bargaining. Implicitly, they treat other factors as minor
refinements to a basically sound model.”).
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rationality. Instead, overconfidence, self-serving biases, framing,
denial mechanisms, anchoring, discount rates, and risk
43
preferences all skew bargains.

Based on this approach to the shadow-of-trial theory, Bibas argues
that the original analysis regarding expected trial outcome is
modified in each case based on the above-described factors.44 By
adding these to the underlying theory, argues Bibas, a more complex
and accurate picture of plea bargaining emerges. Importantly, this
modification of the traditional shadow-of-trial theory actually
expands the role of the defendant in influencing the plea bargaining
machine, a position seemingly at odds with the administrative theory.
Through an analysis of three recent terrorism prosecutions that
resulted in guilty pleas, this article will demonstrate that both the
administrative and shadow-of-trial theories of plea bargaining
accurately reflect portions of the plea bargaining process. As such, a
theory that combines these two models will present a more complete
description of the internal operations of the plea bargaining machine,
the roles played by its actors, and the factors at varying stages of the
process that influence both whether a guilty plea is entered and what
type of benefits are received in return.
II. SETTING THE STAGE—THREE ACTS OF TERROR
A. Richard Reid—A Bargain of One’s Own
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, before the world
could even digest the magnitude of the events that had unfolded on
the East Coast of the United States, another al Qaeda plot was
underway in Europe. The perpetrator of this attack was a young
English man who had been in and out of trouble his entire life and
whose only sense of purpose seemed to materialize after he embraced
the hate inspired teachings of radical extremism.

43. Id. at 2467.
44. See id. at 2545 (“Trials affect pleas, but so do many other influences unrelated to the merits.”).
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Born in England in 1973, Richard Reid left school at the age of
sixteen to enter a life of street crime and car thievery similar to his
father’s pursuits. Reid’s first arrest came in 1990 at the age of
seventeen and represented merely the beginning of a revolving door
that took him in and out of prison numerous times over the next few
years.45
In the mid-1990s, Reid reunited with his father, who had been
absent for much of his childhood due to his own incarcerations, and
was introduced by him to Islam. His father, who converted to Islam
while in prison in the 1980s, believed his son could benefit from
participating in the faith.46 Though Reid did not immediately embrace
the suggestion, he did decide to convert the next time he was
incarcerated.
After being released from prison in 1994, Reid joined the Brixton
Mosque and Islamic Cultural Center in London. Perhaps dissatisfied
with the Brixton Mosque’s moderate tones, Reid quickly left for the
notoriously radical Finsbury Park mosque in north London. The
Finsbury Park mosque is known to have been frequented by Zacarias
Moussaoui, who was convicted of complicity in the September 11,
2001 attacks, and three individuals linked to the failed attempt to
bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, France, in 2002.47 It was here that
Reid was exposed to radical extremist philosophies and the
promotion of jihad.
By 1998, Reid had decided to join the al Qaeda movement, and in
1999 he left England for Pakistan where he crossed the border into
Afghanistan to attend terrorist training camps. After receiving
training in Afghanistan, Reid returned to England in 2001 before
beginning a journey that took him to Israel, Egypt, and Turkey.
45. Alan Cowell, Jailed Briton, The Shadowy Trail and Shift to Islam of a Bomb Suspect, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A1; Elliott, supra note 1, at 48.
46. Elliott, supra note 1, at 48 (“Muslims, he says, ‘treat you like a human being.’ Plus, he says, they
get better food in prison. Richard took his father’s advice. The next time he was incarcerated, he
converted.”).
47. Id. (“Moussaoui was a regular at Finsbury Park, as were other al-Qaeda operatives, such as
Djamel Beghal and probably Kamel Daoudi, two Frenchmen currently being held for their alleged role
in a plot to blow up the American embassy in Paris. Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian former professional
soccer player now being held in Belgium, who is alleged to have been the designated suicide bomber in
the Paris-embassy plot, is also thought to have frequented the mosque.”).
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During these travels, Reid scouted for potential terrorist targets
before returning to Afghanistan to be debriefed and, presumably,
assigned the mission that would lead him to become the notorious
“shoe bomber.” According to authorities, after receiving his mission,
Reid traveled to the Netherlands and Brussels before arriving in Paris
in December 2001.48
According to Parisian officials, Reid did not stay at a hotel during
his time in the capital, thus implying that he was housed by fellow
conspirators in the days preceding the attack. On December 21, 2001,
Reid made his first attempt to board an American Airlines flight to
Miami. Turned away because of his suspicious appearance and
because he had no luggage or carry-on bags for the lengthy flight,
Reid returned to Charles de Gaulle Airport on December 22, 2001,
and successfully boarded American Airlines Flight 63.49
Given Reid’s psychological condition at the time of his
apprehension after American Airlines Flight 63 landed at Boston’s
Logan Airport, it appeared unlikely that he would participate in any
manner in the American criminal justice system. In fact, one would
expect that an individual who was as committed as Reid to the ideals
of the al Qaeda network might even attempt to utilize a criminal trial
as a forum to condemn the institutions and organizations against
which he was fighting.50 Yet, on October 3, 2002, Reid filed a motion

48. Id. at 49 (“By the summer of 2001, Reid was back in London. In July he obtained a new British
passport in Amsterdam, claiming that he had accidentally put his old one through a washing machine,
and flew to Israel on an El Al Flight. Once in Israel, according to security sources there, Reid spent most
of his time in Tel Aviv, where he cased the mall and office complex called the Azrieli Center as well as
the local bus and train stations . . . . After 10 days in Israel, Reid crossed into Egypt and from there flew
to Turkey and back to Pakistan before being debriefed . . . in Afghanistan.”); see also Cowell, supra
note 45, at A1 (“Since his arrest there have been increasing indications that Richard Reid’s travels in the
last three years—to Pakistan, Cairo and the Gaza Strip—had dark purposes as well.”).
49. This was not the first time Reid was detained for questioning before boarding a flight. In July
2001, Reid was detained by Israeli officials before boarding an El Al flight to Israel because of
suspicious behavior. See Cowell, supra note 45, at B3.
50. In 2006, Zacarias Moussaoui testified at his trial related to the attacks on September 11, 2001,
and boasted of his involvement in the plot and his approval of the event:
[W]hen he began his long-awaited testimony on Monday, he offered a lengthy
description of a far deeper involvement with Al Qaeda and its plots. Not only was he a
member of the terror network, he told the jury, he also said that he knew most of the Sept.
11 hijackers, admitted that he lied to investigators about his knowledge of their plot when
he was arrested on immigration violations three weeks before the attacks on New York
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stating his intent to plead guilty to all charges.51 The motion also
requested that the court remove any reference in the indictment to his
having attended an al Qaeda training camp. Unlike most guilty pleas,
there was no plea bargain with the government, but, rather, Reid
decided to plead guilty without the promise of any leniency from the
prosecution. It is important to note that Reid was offered the
opportunity to negotiate with the prosecution for a more lenient
sentence. Reid, however, declined to cooperate, and the government
had made it clear from the beginning that any negotiation would
require an agreement that he provide information regarding his
involvement with al Qaeda.52
Although Reid did not seek leniency from the government, there
was a strong incentive for him to plead guilty. He sought to avoid the
publicity associated with a trial. Reid’s defense attorney stated,
“[Reid] has no disagreement with the facts asserted in the charges as
to his actions on December 22, 2001, and wants to avoid the publicity
associated with a trial and the negative impact it is likely to have
upon his family.”53 This same desire to avoid further psychological
costs for his family was also the impetus behind his request that any
reference to al Qaeda be removed from his indictment. For Reid, the
memory of a lone assailant would be less harmful to his family than
the image of a radical terrorist working for the same group that had
conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks.54
and the Pentagon, and recounted that he was ecstatic when, behind bars, he heard the
news of the attacks on a radio he had bought for that purpose.
Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui, Undermining Case, Now Ties Himself to 9/11 Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2006, at A1.
51. Pam Belluck, Threats and Responses: The Shoe-Bomb Suspect; Man Accused of Shoe-Bomb Plot
Says He Intends to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at A1.
52. See id. at A17 (“Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a statement saying: ‘Richard Reid, like
any defendant, is free to plead guilty to criminal charges. The Justice Department has not entered into
any plea agreement with Reid.’ The source close to the defense said that the government made it ‘pretty
clear from the beginning that if Mr. Reid was not willing to cooperate they weren’t going to give him
anything.’”).
53. Id. at A17.
54. Recently, Najibullah Zazi became yet another high profile terror suspect to plead guilty. In a
manner similar to Richard Reid, Zazi pleaded guilty, “in part out of concern that a widening inquiry
would result in more charges against his family members, including his mother.” A.G. Sulzberger &
William K. Rashbaum, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York Subway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2010, at A23.
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On December 22, 2002, following his plea of guilty, Reid was
sentenced to life in prison. At his sentencing, despite his prior efforts
to distance himself from al Qaeda for the benefit of his family, Reid
informed the judge that he was, in fact, a member of the terrorist
organization. In concluding his remarks, Reid pledged his support
once more for Osama bin Laden and declared himself to be an enemy
of the United States.55 It is likely that these statements resulted from
the court’s refusal to remove the references to al Qaeda in the
indictment, and, therefore, Reid realized he and his family would be
subjected to the stigma of the association despite his initial efforts to
the contrary.
The Reid case demonstrates a vital aspect of the plea bargaining
machine that has to date been neglected in the scholarship. In every
case where the defendant pleads guilty, the defendant receives
inherent institutional benefits in return, regardless of whether the
defendant also receives additional benefits from the prosecution. This
aspect of the system will be termed unilateral plea bargaining because
the defendant is trading the right to trial in return for certain benefits
offered by the system itself and not by the government.
In cases where the defendant has entered into a bilateral plea
bargain with the government, the additional institutional benefits are
another incentive to plead guilty. In cases where the defendant will
not or cannot engage in bilateral negotiations, such as the Reid case,
the defendant may plead guilty merely for these institutional benefits.
It should be noted that defendants, such as Reid, who plead guilty
merely for the institutional benefits are typically those defendants
against whom the government’s case is the strongest. This is true for
two reasons. First, where the defendant’s case is strong, it is unlikely
that the smaller benefits associated with a unilateral plea bargain will
create a sufficient incentive for the defendant to forego the possibility
of acquittal at trial. Second, and by the same token, if the
government’s case is weak, the prosecution will likely offer some
55. Man Charged as Accomplice in “Shoe” Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A37. Several years
later, Saajid Badat, also from England, pleaded guilty to plotting to bomb an airliner bound for the
United States as part of a conspiracy with Richard Reid. Lizette Alvarez, Briton, in Shift, Pleads Guilty
in Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at A8.
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additional benefits to encourage a bargain. Unilateral plea bargaining
is a vital, yet ignored aspect of the criminal justice system and should
be included in any model of plea bargaining as it is present in every
criminal case resulting in a plea of guilty.56
Where a defendant is considering the inherent institutional benefits
of pleading guilty, there are a variety of factors that might motivate
the individual to do so. These might include, among others, the
possibility of a reduction in the applicable sentence due to the
acceptance of responsibility credit found at section 3E1.1 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines; an increased likelihood that the
court will entertain a request for assignment to a specific prison for
geographical and health related reasons; or the avoidance of the
financial and psychological burdens of a trial on both defendants and
their families.57 In the case of Reid, the benefit he sought from the
system was the opportunity for his family to avoid further
associational stigma by requesting the court remove reference to al
Qaeda in his indictment and by avoiding the negative publicity he
and his family would suffer during a lengthy and well-publicized
trial.58 While offers of leniency in return for cooperation were of no
interest to Reid, the opportunity to spare his family the societal costs
associated with a trial were incentive enough for him to bypass a trial

56. See Dervan, supra note 8, at 478 (describing plea bargaining as a system in which “rights are
exchanged for concessions”); see also Alschuler, supra note 16; Jeff Palmer, Abolishing Plea
Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 508–11 (1999); Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1912.
57. As an example, under section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who
“clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” may receive a decrease in the
applicable offense level by two levels and, if the original offense level is sixteen or greater, may also
receive an additional one level reduction. In the notes section of the chapter, it states, “This adjustment
is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying
the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.”
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2007).
58. Mary A. Farkas & Gale Miller, Reentry and Reintegration: Challenges Faced by the Families of
Convicted Sex Offenders, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 88, 90 (2007) (“A ‘courtesy stigma’ is attached to
families, which results in their social marginalization, even though they did not commit a sex offense.
For many family members, their identities as spouses, parents, siblings, and children are suspended
while they try to negotiate their daily lives.”). See generally SOCIAL WORK AND DISADVANTAGE:
ADDRESSING THE ROOTS OF STIGMA THROUGH ASSOCIATION (Peter Burke & Jonathan Parker eds.,
2007) (discussing stigma by association).
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and acquiesce to the criminal justice system’s desire for his
imprisonment.
The Reid case, therefore, demonstrates that in attempting to
understand the plea bargaining machine, one must acknowledge that
the prosecution is not always in control of the process and, at times,
may not even participate. Plea bargains in which defendants trade
benefits with the system itself are an important aspect of the machine
and must not be discounted when constructing plea bargaining
theory. Furthermore, one gains a greater understanding of the
diversity of factors influencing whether a plea of guilty will be
entered if one realizes that defendants sometimes bargain for benefits
other than sentencing reductions and sometimes seek benefits that are
available from sources other than the prosecution, such as the court or
the criminal justice process itself.
B. Lodi, California—A Pre-Emptive Strike
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation revised their missions
with regard to terrorism prosecutions. Traditionally, the agencies had
structured and executed criminal investigations with the purpose of
securing convictions for the most readily provable offenses. At times,
this approach meant investigations would linger for years as evidence
was compiled and the strongest case possible was obtained. In
response to the attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the District
of Columbia, the government quickly realized that this strategy could
not persist, and prevention, even at the expense of prosecutions,
would become the driving priority for terrorism related
investigations.59

59. See
Amy
Waldman,
Prophetic
Justice,
ATLANTIC,
Oct.
2006,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/prophetic-justice/5234/1/ (“The September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon prompted a fundamental shift in the
American government’s approach to Islamic terrorism. Before 9/11, the government largely responded
to attacks that had already occurred—by launching cruise missiles at terrorist bases in Afghanistan and
Sudan after the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, for example, or by prosecuting the planners and
perpetrators of those bombings in federal court. . . . But after 9/11, the focus turned to prevention.”).
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Bob Woodward recounts the implementations of the new
prevention model of law enforcement after 9/11 in his account of the
government’s response to the attacks. According to Woodward, at a
meeting of the National Security Council, during which FBI director
Robert Mueller stated that care needed to be exercised to ensure
evidence was not tainted during subsequent arrests and prosecutions,
Attorney General John Ashcroft interrupted the conversation and
stated, “Let’s stop the discussion right here . . . . The chief mission of
U.S. law enforcement . . . is to stop another attack and apprehend any
accomplices or terrorists before they hit us again. If we can’t bring
them to trial, so be it.”60
In a white paper on counterterrorism in 2006, the Department of
Justice elaborated on the specific manner in which the agency’s
mission changed in 2001:
The events of September 11 transformed the mission of the
Department of Justice. The Department revised its Strategic Plan
to emphasize the prevention and disruption of terrorism. Indeed,
the protection of our national security and the prevention of
terrorist acts are our number one goal. On every level, we are
now committed to a new strategy of prevention. This includes
the design, implementation and support of policies and strategies,
including the investigation and prosecution of terrorism and
terrorism-related cases and the pursuit of legislative initiatives,
which will prevent, disrupt and defeat domestic and international
61
terrorist operations before they occur.

In conformity with this new Department of Justice strategy, termed
preemptive prosecution, the FBI was informed that its field offices
would no longer be permitted to set priorities, and instead, there was
one national priority—prevention.62
60. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 42 (2002).
61. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 5 (2006).
62. Kelly Moore, The Role of Federal Criminal Prosecutions in the War on Terrorism, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 837, 838–39 (2007) (“In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, the
government made a dramatic shift in its approach to terrorism prosecutions. The new philosophy called

2011]

PLEA BARGAINING

261

It was in this climate of prevention and intervention that a much
different terrorism investigation and prosecution than that of Richard
Reid unfolded against several men from Lodi, California, a
community which is located approximately forty miles south of
Sacramento and which has had a large Pakistani community since the
early 1900s.
On May 29, 2005, at 5:30 a.m., the FBI field office in Sacramento
received information from FBI headquarters that an individual on the
government’s “No Fly” list was traveling from Pakistan to San
Francisco. The individual was Hamid Hayat, a twenty-three year old
with little direction in his life who drifted between Lodi and his
family’s home country of Pakistan.63 In response to this information,
the plane was diverted to Japan where FBI agents on the ground
interviewed Hayat and then eventually released him to complete his
journey home.
Despite being convinced that Hayat posed no immediate threat, the
FBI was uncertain of Hayat’s long-term intentions upon his arrival
back in the United States. Therefore, on June 4, 2005, FBI agents
interviewed Hayat again. During this interrogation, Hayat was
specifically asked if he had attended any terrorist training camps, to
which he responded that he would never be involved in such
extremism. Perhaps in an effort to convince authorities of the truth of
his statements, Hayat agreed to a request that he return the next day
with his father to take a polygraph test. It was upon completing this
polygraph test that the case suddenly took a new direction.
According to the FBI, after failing portions of the polygraph test,
Hayat admitted to attending terrorist training camps during visits to
Pakistan and receiving training in weapons, explosives, hand-to-hand
combat, and other paramilitary exercises. When Hayat’s father was
asked whether his son attended any terrorist training camps, he told
the FBI agents there were no such camps in Pakistan. After being
for using every available federal criminal statute to pursue people that existing intelligence suggested
might be involved in supporting or participating in terrorist organizations and acts of terrorism. The new
goal was to detect, prevent, disrupt, and deter terrorism.”).
63. Greg Krikorian & Rone Tempest, 2 Men Held in Links to Terror, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at
B1.
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informed of his son’s confession, however, the elder Hayat allegedly
admitted that his son had attended terrorist camps and that he had
provided him with $100 a month allowance during these trips. He
also informed the agents that he himself had witnessed weapons
training at such camps.
Though at the time of their interrogations neither had engaged in
direct acts of terrorism, the Department of Justice’s new preventative
strategy clearly called for the arrests of both men on whatever
charges might be available simply to get them off the street. As a
result, the government detained the younger Hayat on two charges of
lying to agents about his attending terrorist training camps and
receiving weapons training and detained the elder Hayat on a single
charge of lying to agents about his knowledge of his son’s activities
in Pakistan.64
The defense attorney for the elder Hayat immediately recognized
that the Department of Justice’s strategy of preventive prosecution
had limited the government’s ability to bring more severe charges
against the two men. In commenting on the lack of more significant
charges, he stated, “We don’t see any of that here. If the government
can prove they attended a camp and therefore are terrorists, then why
didn’t they charge them with that?”65 While it is true that the
government had very little to work with during the opening hours of
the investigation, they were able to gather sufficient evidence to add a
much more significant charge against the son prior to trial—the
charge of materially supporting a terrorist network.
Following September 11, 2001, the government did not seek new
laws to utilize in the preemptive prosecution model. Rather, the
government relied on 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, a law that was initially
passed in the 1990s and that barred “material support” of terrorism.66
The statute makes it unlawful to “knowingly provide[] material

64. Eric Bailey, Lodi Men Accused of Lying to FBI, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at B1.
65. Id.
66. See Brian P. Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 723, 724–25 (2005).
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support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”67 The term
“material support or resources” is defined as follows:
[C]urrency or monetary instruments or financial securities,
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses,
false
documentation
or
identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation, except
68
medicine or religious materials . . . .

As applied to situations such as the Lodi case, the material support
statute allowed for prosecution of an individual who had not executed
a terrorist attack but who had been linked to a terrorist organization
and whom the government believed was a future threat. While the
material support charge for Hayat was less than many expected for an
individual the government had labeled an al Qaeda sleeper agent,
these charges represented the best means of moving forward with a
significant preemptive prosecution where little evidence of an actual
planned terrorist strike existed.69 Responding to these concerns, U.S.
Attorney McGregor Scott stated, “We have detected, we have
disrupted and we have deterred, . . . and whatever was taking shape in
Lodi isn’t going to happen now.”70 The government, therefore, was
satisfied that it had fulfilled its obligation to intervene early even if it
resulted in a riskier and less severe prosecution.
Based on the limited evidence that had been gathered, the
prosecution moved forward to trial in February 2006. The case lasted
67. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010).
68. Id. § 2339A(b). The definition of material support was expanded after September 11, 2001, to
include “expert advice or assistance.” This addition and the material support law itself have been
challenged in court proceedings since 9/11, but the issue of the statute’s constitutionality is not within
the focus of this article. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 382, 405 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Comerford, supra note 66, at 724–25 (discussing the challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).
For a discussion of terrorism laws generally, see Nora V. Demleitner, How Many Terrorists Are There?
The Escalation in So-Called Terrorism Prosecutions, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 38 (2003).
69. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2005) (“[P]rosecutors have creatively interpreted existing laws
banning the provision of assets and other forms of support to terrorist organizations and individuals in
order to make it a crime to be an active member of or to receive training from such groups.”).
70. Rone Tempest, Lodi Man Indicted in Alleged Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005 at B3.
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several weeks and painted two vastly different pictures of the Hayats.
While the defense argued that the confessions had been forced, the
prosecution contended that the Hayats were part of a global war. In
particular, the prosecution argued that the son was a man “with a
jihadi heart and a jihadi mind.”71 To support these assertions, the
government relied on evidence such as a note carried by the son in
his wallet that read, “Oh Allah, we place you at their throats, and we
seek refuge in you from their evil.”72 Furthermore, the government
freely acknowledged to the jury that it had acted early and this
decision prevented them from gathering all the evidence they would
typically procure before indicting a defendant. One of the prosecutors
told the jury, “This is not a case where a building has been blown up,
and you know, the forensic investigators go in, they go looking
through the rubble looking for clues . . . . This isn’t that kind of case.
This is a charge that allows the FBI to prevent acts of violence like
that.”73 He concluded by asking whether Americans would want
anything less.74
After significant deliberations, the jury deadlocked on the guilt of
the elder Hayat, and U.S. District Judge Garland E. Burrell declared a
mistrial. The jury, however, returned a verdict of guilty for the son,
and he was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. In reporting on
the split outcome, the media focused, as the prosecution had in its
own case, on the difficulty associated with proving guilt at trial while
implementing the new preemptive prosecution strategy. In
summarizing the dilemma, one reporter wrote, “Its supporters say it is
an important tool to head off threats. Critics say it allows the
government to subject people to lengthy prison terms based on little
evidence that they intended to hurt anyone.”75 The government’s
71. Rone Tempest, Lodi Terror Case Goes to the Jury, LA TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at B3.
72. Waldman, supra note 59. See generally Tempest, supra note 71.
73. Waldman, supra note 59. See generally Tempest, supra note 71.
74. Waldman, supra note 59.
75. Richard Schmitt, For the Justice Department, a Welcome Conviction, LA TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006,
at A15. (“The case shows how prosecutors are attempting to use the law to disrupt what they see as
evolving terrorist plots before they reach fruition. But the strategy, first enunciated by Atty. Gen. John
Ashcroft a few weeks after the attacks at the Pentagon and in New York, has also been highly
controversial. Its supporters say it is an important tool to head off threats. Critics say it allows the
government to subject people to lengthy prison terms based on little evidence that they intended to hurt
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gamble of prosecuting the Hayats based on what little evidence could
be gathered resulted in a split verdict, but the government quickly
came back and announced they would retry the elder Hayat. Despite
taking this strong stand following defeat, both the prosecution and the
defense were ready to utilize the plea bargaining machine.
For the prosecution, the specter of another lengthy and expensive
trial that might result in a hung jury or an acquittal was not appealing.
Hayat also had reason to negotiate as he had already spent a year in
jail and risked the possibility of less success with a second jury. As in
the Reid case, Hayat was also concerned about the stigma of a
terrorism conviction and alerted the prosecution early in the process
that he would not plead guilty to any terrorism charges.76 Eventually,
the two sides reached an agreement, and, on May 31, 2006, Hayat
pleaded guilty to a customs violation in exchange for a sentence of
time served. In explaining the government’s decision to enter into an
agreement with an individual it had claimed was part of a global
jihad, the U.S. Attorney stated, “This outcome, of course, was not the
one most desired by the government . . . [but i]t was my decision that
the felony plea we announce here today was the best resolution of
this matter for the government.”77 Relying once again on the
preemptive prosecution strategy to justify the case’s resolution, he
concluded by stating, “Our region is much safer today than it was one
year ago.”78
For purposes of furthering our understanding of the plea
bargaining machine, the first important element of the Hayat case is
that, unlike the Reid prosecution, it involved bilateral plea
negotiations that resulted in an agreement beneficial to both parties.
That the government offered incentives for this plea, however, does
not mean that the defendant did not also consider and receive the
inherent institutional benefits of pleading guilty. For instance, as with
anyone. In effect, ‘you prosecute people not for what they have done but for what you fear they might
do in the future,’ said David Cole, a Georgetown University law professor.”).
76. See Rone Tempest & Eric Bailey, Lodi Man Is Released in Plea Bargain, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2006, at B7 (“‘There is no way we were ever going to agree to any plea involving terrorism,’ Griffin
said outside the Sacramento Federal Courthouse, ‘because it was not true.’”).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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the Reid case, Hayat’s guilty plea enabled him and his family to
avoid the stigma, financial and psychological burdens, and other
hardships of a second trial. Furthermore, Hayat benefited from the
certainty of the plea bargaining process, whereas a second trial on the
full spectrum of charges meant risking conviction and a lengthy
prison sentence.
Second, in contrast to the administrative theory’s portrait of an
unwilling defendant forced to accept the government’s determination
of both charges and sentence, Hayat provides an example of an active
defendant engaged in the plea bargaining process.79 First, Hayat
made clear his intent to bargain with the prosecution, thus identifying
from whom he sought additional incentives beyond the institutional
benefits available for pleading guilty. Second, Hayat identified the
specific incentives that would encourage him to plead guilty. This is a
vital role for the defendant in the plea bargaining system, because it
alerts the prosecution to factors important to the specific defendant,
therefore increasing the likelihood of a successful plea offer. Here,
Hayat alerted the government that he would only accept a plea
bargain that did not result in a “terrorism” conviction. Not willing to
accept the risks of a complete acquittal for Hayat in the second trial,
the government focused on this factor and utilized it to create an offer
that was sufficient to result in a plea bargain. Although such a
significant benefit might not be offered in all cases, the challenges
associated with the government’s preemptive prosecution strategy in
terrorism cases meant that Hayat was in a position to assert pressure
on the government for this concession. Finally, after influencing the
plea bargaining machine in a manner that resulted in his receiving the
types and quality of benefits desired, Hayat accepted the bargain.
Third, while the modified shadow-of-trial theory appears to more
accurately describe the posturing and negotiating that occurs in the
preliminary phase of the bilateral plea bargaining process, the
administrative theory is correct that prosecutors control much of the

79. Gifford, supra note 25; Johnson, supra note 35, at 779; Klein, supra note 30; Langbein, supra
note 35, at 12–13; O’Hear, supra note 31, at 426; Wright & Miller, supra note 29, at 1415. See generally
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000).
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decision-making regarding the ultimate charges and sentence that will
result.80 In the Hayat case, the defendant exerted significant influence
over the prosecution’s evaluation of the case through engaging them
in negotiations and identifying the type of benefits sought. The
government then utilized this information and reached a decision
regarding an acceptable plea offer. There is little doubt that if Hayat
had refused to accept the government’s offer, he would have been
prosecuted on the original charges at a second trial. This did not
occur, however, because the government, in making its
administrative determination regarding the appropriate charge and
sentence for the plea agreement, appears to have properly considered
both the risks of trial, the barriers to a successful plea deal, and the
benefits sought by the defendant when constructing its offer. If this
had not been so, Hayat would likely have gone to trial again. While
the administrative phase of the bilateral plea negotiations process
does result in the government forcing its final determination on the
defendant, when examined in conjunction with the first phase of the
process it appears less nefarious. Instead, the administrative
determination appears more a reflection of the specific case and the
benefits important to each side in reaching a resolution. Although not
every offer will contain all of the benefits sought by each party, a
successful plea offer must contain sufficient incentives for the
defendant to accept, and, as demonstrated by Hayat’s refusal to plead
guilty to a terrorism charge, these incentives must be tailored to the
specific defendant and, in many cases, include more than a mere
reduction in sentence.
C. Lackawanna Six—Battling an Unknown Mission
Lackawanna, New York, is an old steel town south of Buffalo with
a large Yemeni-American neighborhood of over 3,000 people.
Families from Yemen began moving to the area forty to fifty years
80. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66; Church, supra note 37, at 512–14, 523;
Easterbrook, Bargaining as Compromise, supra note 37, at 1975; Easterbrook, Market System, supra
note 37, at 309–17; Landes, supra note 37, at 66–69; Ruttenburg, supra note 37; Scott & Stuntz, supra
note 37, at 1935; see KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, at 31–32.
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ago, and today they have established a strong neighborhood, which
they consider to be “one big family.”81 In 1998, however, a former
member of the community reappeared and forever changed the
history of this neighborhood.
Kamal Derwish moved to Lackawanna in 1998 and almost
immediately began speaking at the local mosque about his beliefs.82
For the most part, his early activities seemed like legitimate
community building as he spoke of keeping kids off the street and
away from drugs. Over time, however, he began taking more
extremist positions and eventually convinced seven young men to
travel to Afghanistan to attend al Qaeda training camps.
Unbeknownst to the small Lackawanna community at the time,
Derwish was an al Qaeda recruiter sent to New York to convince as
many individuals as he could to join his cause.83
As the seven Lackawanna men set off for Afghanistan in the spring
of 2001, they devised a story to cover their tracks. They told their
friends and family they were traveling to Pakistan to study with an
Islamic evangelical group. According to one of the seven, “It was
adventure . . . . You’re going to learn how to use weapons. That part
of it was like the exciting part. You’re going to be able to shoot, you
know, and this and that.”84 After arriving in Pakistan, the group
traveled into Afghanistan where they were greeted by Osama bin
81. Brian P. Comerford, supra note 66, at 726–32; Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the
Trail Led: Between Evidence and Suspicion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at A1; Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of
Military Detention, BYU L. REV. 1255, 1270 (2006); see also Chesney, supra note 69, at 39–45
(providing a general factual description of Lackawanna case).
82. According to the FBI, Derwish was born in Lackawanna in 1973, but his family moved to Saudi
Arabia. In the 1990s, he attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan and fought in Bosnia. He
returned to Saudi Arabia in 1997 and was imprisoned for extremist activities. In 1998, he moved back to
Lackawanna to begin recruiting for al Qaeda. Purdy & Bergman, supra note 81.
83. Id. (describing an FBI memorandum regarding al Qaeda recruiters, “‘After a mosque is chosen,’
the memo says, an operative ‘identifies young Islamic men who are attending the center for worship and
knowledge of Islam.’ Then ‘a friendship is developed with each individual and over time, each
individual’s interests, emotional state, strengths and weaknesses are identified.’ After a while,
discussions ‘begin to detail historical Muslim conflict’ and the persecution and rape of Muslims.’
Finally, ‘individual members are approached about becoming prepared to defend Muslim beliefs and
fight for Jihad.’ The description, the memo says, is based on ‘how Kamal Derwish recruited the Buffalo
cell members.’ Put another way, Mr. Derwish was not just trying to return young men to the ways of the
Prophet; he was trying to lure them to Osama bin Laden.”).
84. Id.
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Laden. At this point, several of the group realized they had made a
terrible mistake, and as a result, four of the men left the six-week
training camp early.85
At the same time the men were in Afghanistan, an unsigned,
handwritten letter arrived at the FBI field office in Buffalo, New
York. The note stated that eight men from Lackawanna had traveled
to an al Qaeda training camp.86 Shortly thereafter, the FBI contacted
one of the men, Sahim Alwan, who, having left the training camp
early, was already back in New York. Alwan met with an agent, but
merely related the agreed upon cover story regarding religious study
in Pakistan. There was no evidence of a crime, and, having been
presented with a plausible explanation for Alwan’s travels, the FBI
moved on to other matters. After September 11, 2001, however, the
government’s focus returned to Lackawanna.
As was discussed with regard to the Lodi investigation, the
Department of Justice’s and FBI’s missions changed drastically
following the September 11, 2001, attacks.87 FBI Director Robert
Mueller stated, “Our overriding priority right now is prevention.”88 In
conformity with this strategy, FBI officials in Buffalo, New York,
stated of the Lackawanna men, “If we don’t know for sure they’re
going to do something, or not, we need to make sure that we prevent
anything they may be planning, whether or not we know or don’t
know about it.”89 As such, the FBI made the Lackawanna group a top
national priority, despite the lack of evidence or information
regarding plans for any future attacks. At the height of the
investigation, the FBI was producing field reports on the situation
twice a day, and the President received daily briefings on the
matter.90
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Purdy & Bergman, supra note 81. (“From Sept. 11 on, the driving goal of the government was to
find the next sleeper cell before it struck.”).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (“Headquarters ordered written updates twice a day, at 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. Mr. Mueller was
briefed twice daily, the officials said, and he often made Lackawanna part of his daily briefing to
President Bush. Stanley Borgia, then second in command in the Buffalo F.B.I., said, ‘I would look at my
watch and say, 8:30. The president is saying to the directors, ‘What’s going on in Buffalo?’”).
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Throughout this stage of the investigation, however, the
Lackawanna men remained consistent regarding their cover story,
and little in the way of new evidence materialized. Then, in the
summer of 2002, events unfolded that forced the government to
respond, despite the lack of evidence of any crime. By this time, two
of the seven Lackawanna recruits were outside the United States. One
had moved to Yemen and another, Mukhtar al-Bakri, was traveling in
the Middle East in preparations for his wedding in Bahrain. During
this trip, al-Bakri emailed back to the United States a message that
read, “The next meal will be very huge. No one will be able to
withstand it except those with faith.”91 For the intelligence
community, the term “meal” was synonymous with attack, and the
FBI was left with the choice of piecing together a preemptive
prosecution or waiting for further evidence at the risk of allowing a
terrorist attack to go unstopped:
Once the C.I.A. gave Lackawanna the “most dangerous” label
. . . the administration asked, “Can you guarantee to me that
these people won’t do something?” Mr. Watson [the FBI’s
counterterrorism chief at the time] said.
“And the answer,” he said, “is we think we can. We are probably
99 percent sure that we can make sure that these guys don’t do
something—if they are planning to do something. And under the
rules that we were playing under at the time, that’s not
acceptable. So a conscious decision was made, ‘Let’s get ‘em out
92
of here.’”

As one official noted of the decision, “What do we do if we believe
they’re going to do something, and we have nothing to pull them off
the street with?”93
The government determined that the answer was to find one
member of the Lackawanna group who would turn on the others and

91. Id.
92. Purdy & Bergman, supra note 81.
93. Id.
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provide the evidence necessary to bring charges of material support
of a terrorist organization. Just as in the Lodi case, the government
had no direct evidence of a terrorist plot but could creatively use the
material support statutes to bring charges related to the men’s
attendance at al Qaeda training camps. This, the government
contended, would be a means of stopping any future plans for which
the men might be preparing. As such, in the middle of the night,
Bahraini police burst into the hotel room of newly married al-Bakri,
the sender of the “meal” email, and arrested him.94 On September 11,
2002, on the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents traveled
to Bahrain to interrogate al-Bakri. He admitted almost immediately
that he and the other five men still in Lackawanna had traveled to
Afghanistan to attend a training camp. A short while later in
Lackawanna, the FBI approached Alwan with details from the
interrogation of al-Bakri. Realizing the charade was over, he too
confessed to the actual events. The arrests of the remaining four men
in Lackawanna followed shortly thereafter. In announcing the arrests,
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson stated, “United States law
enforcement . . . has identified, investigated and disrupted [an al]
Qaeda-trained terrorist cell on American soil.”95
The six defendants faced a two-count indictment on charges of
providing material support to a terrorist organization.96 The first
charge, providing material support, carried a maximum ten-year
sentence, while the second charge, conspiracy, carried a maximum
fifteen-year sentence. Under these charges, each defendant faced a
possible twenty-five year sentence. The six pleaded guilty in quick
succession, each determining that the benefits of a guilty plea
outweighed the risks associated with proceeding to trial. In return for
the pleas, the government dropped the conspiracy charges, and each
man received a sentence between seven and ten years depending on
94. Id.
95. Id. Derwish was killed on November 3, 2002, in the Yemeni dessert by a missile fired from a
CIA Predator drone. Id. The seventh Lackawanna man to attend the training camps, who had relocated
overseas prior to the arrests, was detained by authorities in Yemen in January 2004 and, reportedly,
remains in their custody. Brian P. Comerford, supra note 66, at 730 (2005).
96. Marc Santora, Six Indicted on Charges of Providing Material Aid to Terrorist Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at A19.
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his conduct and cooperation, a significant reduction from the
potential twenty-five year sentence they faced at trial.
Faysal Galab was the first to plead guilty, and he received the most
lenient prison term of all the men in return—seven years.97 Shafal
Mosed pleaded guilty and apologized to the court for his actions.
According to Mosed’s attorney, the government threatened to declare
him an enemy combatant if he refused to cooperate.98 The
government argued for a lighter sentence because Mosed assisted law
enforcement and left the training camp early.99 He received eight
years in prison, as did Yasein Taher who also cooperated.100 Sahim
Alwan pleaded guilty and received nine and a half years in prison.101
Yahya Goba pleaded guilty in return for a recommended sentence of
eight years, although the court sentenced him to ten years in prison.
According to his attorney, Goba pleaded guilty, in part, because of
family considerations and the possibility that the government would
charge him with a more serious crime.102 Mukhtar al-Bakri was the
last of the six men to plead guilty, and he received a sentence of ten
years.103 According to his attorney, he pleaded guilty out of fear that
the government would file additional charges.104
In summarizing the government’s efforts to respond to the
Lackawanna Six, the FBI agent first assigned to investigate the
mysterious anonymous letter informing the government of a potential

97. Robert F. Worth, Accused Member of Terror Cell Near Buffalo Agrees to Guilty Plea, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A9; see also Roya Aziz & Monica Lam, Profiles: The Lackawanna Cell,
FRONTLINE, Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/profiles.html.
98. Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department’s Antiterror Weapon of Choice,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15 (“Lee A. Albert, a law professor at the University of Buffalo who has
followed the case, said that the use of the material support ban against the Lackawanna defendants was
‘a reach,’ and that prosecutors might have been worried that their case would not hold up at trial.”); see
also Another Man in Buffalo Case Pleads Guilty to Qaeda Link, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2003, at D7.
99. David Staba, New York Man in Qaeda Case Will Serve Eight Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003,
at A28.
100. Guilty Plea in Lackawanna Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2003, at B10; see Aziz & Lam, supra
note 97.
101. Aziz & Lam, supra note 97; Plea by Man Who Met bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at B13.
102. Aziz & Lam, supra note 97; New York Man Admits to Attending Al Qaeda Training Camp, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at B15.
103. Aziz & Lam, supra note 97.
104. Matthew Purdy, Sixth Man Pleads Guilty to Al Qaeda Training, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at
A17.
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terrorist cell summarized the case by stating, “We were looking to
prevent something. And we did. Obviously nothing happened. So we
all did our job.”105
First, as with the Hayat plea negotiation, the Lackawanna Six
engaged in bilateral negotiations with the government. Once again,
however, the institutional benefits of pleading guilty were a factor in
the success of the plea bargaining machine. Yahya Goba pleaded
guilty in return for a recommended sentence of eight years, in part,
because of family considerations.106 Just as Richard Reid pleaded
guilty solely for the institutional benefit of sparing his family the
difficulty of a terrorism trial, so too was at least one of the
Lackawanna Six motivated by considerations of stigma and other
trial related costs.107
Second, once again the role of the defendant in the initial phase of
the plea bargaining process contrasts with that portrayed by the
administrative theory of plea bargaining.108 As in the Hayat matter,
the government’s case was weakened by the preemptive prosecution
model of law enforcement adopted for terrorism investigations after
9/11. As such, the government was forced to utilize “material
support” statutes that were not intended to serve as a mechanism for
removing terrorist cells from the streets. Due to the resulting lack of
direct evidence and the tenuously applied charges, a significant risk
of acquittal for at least some of the men existed if bargains were not
reached prior to trial. Seizing this opportunity, the defendants
engaged the government and sought specific benefits in return. Here,
except as noted above, the defendants appear to have been most
interested in reductions in sentence in return for their guilty pleas.
105. Purdy & Bergman, supra note 81. In response to questions about a later terrorist plot and the
need for pre-emptive prosecution, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff stated, “We don’t wait
until someone has lit the fuse to step in.” Eric Lipton, Recent Arrests in Terror Plots Yield Debate on
Pre-emptive Action by Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, § 1, at 11.
106. New York Man Admits to Attending Al Qaeda Training Camp, supra note 102.
107. Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May
Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 L. LEGAL STUD. 355, 362 (2007); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and SelfFulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J. L. & ECON. 519, 540 (1996).
108. See FISHER, supra note 15, at 859; Gifford, supra note 25; Johnson, supra note 35, at 779; Klein,
supra note 30, at 2037; Langbein, supra note 35, at 12–13; O’Hear, supra note 31, at 426; Wright &
Miller, supra note 29, at 1415.

274

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

This is an important aspect of these negotiations as compared with
the Hayat matter, in which the defendant also sought to reduce the
stigma associated with the prosecution through rejection of any
terrorism related charges. Furthermore, as in the Hayat matter, the
defendants played the ultimate role of accepting the government’s
offers.
Finally, the second phase of bilateral plea bargaining is again
demonstrated by the defendants’ acceptance of the government’s
administrative determination of the appropriate charge and sentence,
because each determination was based on the government’s analysis
of the likelihood of success at trial, the barriers to a successful plea
bargain, and the benefits sought. Once again, while the shadow-oftrial theory appears to more accurately describe the posturing and
negotiating that occurs in the preliminary phase of the bilateral plea
bargaining process, the administrative theory more aptly describes
the process by which the government makes its actual plea offer.109
III. THE DUAL CHAMBERS OF THE PLEA BARGAINING MACHINE
Through examination of three terrorism prosecutions that resulted
in guilty pleas, this article has demonstrated both that the concept of
plea bargaining must be expanded to include unilateral and bilateral
plea bargaining and that a combination of the administrative and
modified shadow-of-trial theories provides a more accurate
representation of the two phases of the bilateral plea bargaining
process. In Section III, this article will seek to construct a theory that
reflects these findings. This theory, which will be termed the benefit
distribution theory, will expand our current understanding of both the
breadth of the plea bargaining machine and the roles of the

109. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 37, at 31–32; Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–
66; Church, supra note 37, at 512–14, 523; Easterbrook, Market System, supra note 37, at 309–17;
Easterbrook, Bargaining as Compromise, supra note 37, at 1975; Landes, supra note 37, at 66–69;
Ruttenburg, supra note 37, at 353; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 37, at 1935.
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prosecution and the defense in the negotiation and decision-making
process.110
A. Bilateral Plea Bargaining
1. Calculating the Outcome Differential
Where the government and the defendant are both willing to
consider bilateral plea negotiations, the process begins with each
party evaluating the likelihood of success at trial as described in the
traditional shadow-of-trial theory. The difference between the
likelihood of conviction at trial and a guaranteed conviction at trial is
the “outcome differential.”111 In its most simplistic terms, the
outcome differential is reflective of the strengths and weaknesses of
the prosecution’s and defense’s cases. As such, the weaker the
government’s case is, the larger the outcome differential will be, and
vice versa.112
While the amount and force of evidence is a key consideration in
determining the outcome differential, this calculation must account
for all barriers to the prosecution’s or defense’s success at trial and,
in many cases, includes a variety of considerations. It is here that
many of the institutional barriers to success described by Stephanos
110. Scholars have distinguished between “routine” plea bargaining cases, which are low-level
offenses that rarely result in incarceration, and “adversarial” plea bargaining cases, where the
seriousness of the offense and the significance of the potential punishment result in more structured
bargaining. The terrorism cases described in this article certainly fall within the “adversarial” plea
bargaining category. As such, the model of plea bargaining constructed herein is a highly sophisticated
model tracking the complexities of such “adversarial” bargaining. Nevertheless, this model is equally
applicable to “routine” plea bargaining cases, although certain steps in the model may be less
pronounced due to the minimal risk of incarceration and the presence of unique considerations such as
“going rates” for minimal offenses. O’Hear, supra note 31, at 415–16 (noting that field studies of plea
bargaining have drawn a distinction between routine cases and more adversarial interactions).
111. See Figure 1.
112. See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 788–89 (2008) (“[T]he vast majority of defendants enter plea bargains, which
often agree upon sentences in the hopes that judges will rubber-stamp them. Even though these sentence
bargains do not involve sentencing hearings or appeals, the parties bargain at least in part in the shadow
of the likely sentence. When prosecutors hold all the aces at sentencing, they can drive hard bargains.
Conversely, when their hands are weaker or less predictable, it is easier for defendants to bluff about
insisting on a sentencing hearing and call prosecutors’ bluff.”); see also Alschuler, supra note 26, at 59
(“A Chicago prosecutor says, ‘When we have a weak case for any reason, we’ll reduce to almost
anything rather than lose.’”).
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Bibas become important, such as poor lawyering.113 In the context of
the terrorism prosecutions that this article has examined, the
difficulties experienced by the government due to the policy of
preemptive prosecution and the tenuous application of the material
support statute are examples of barriers to success at trial. In a similar
manner, the defendants’ likelihood of success at trial in the
Lackawanna Six case was impacted by the confessions of two of the
men prior to the arrests of the other men.114 As demonstrated by these
two examples, the factors influencing the outcome of a case may be
applicable to criminal prosecutions generally, a type of criminal
offense such as terrorism, or be unique to a particular matter or
defendant.115 The following model demonstrates the manner in which
the size of the outcome differential shifts based on the barriers to
success at trial.

113. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66. When considering the impact of poor
lawyering, the strength of both the defense attorney and the government attorney are key considerations.
See Ronald F. Wright, Guilty Pleas and Submarkets, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 68,
71–72 (2008) (“Just as there are differences among defendants that matter when we evaluate plea
negotiation practices, there are differences among prosecutors.”); Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L.
Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client’s Perspective:
Empirical Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (2001)
(discussing the importance of the defendant’s perception of his or her attorney).
114. See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
115. See Covey, supra note 37, at 78–79 (“Where plea bargain prices are based primarily on expected
trial outcomes, a defendant’s ability to negotiate a lenient plea bargain will largely depend on the
strength of the evidence and the potential resource savings from a guilty plea. Prosecutors should be
willing to “pay” greater discounts for guilty pleas where the evidence is weak or the resource costs of
trial are greater relative to expected trial sentences.”).
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FIGURE 1
Sliding Scale of Outcome Differentials
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During this first part of the initial assessment of the case, both the
prosecution and the defense have the ability to influence the other’s
perceptions by highlighting or emphasizing the strengths or
weaknesses of the case and alerting the other to the manner in which
the party will support its position or challenge the other’s
assertions.116 For instance, in the Hayat matter, the defense alerted
116. While the judiciary plays almost no role in plea bargaining in the federal system and in most
state systems, there are a few notable exceptions. As Jenia I. Turner noted in her work on judicial
participation in plea negotiations:
In plea bargaining, as in many areas of the American criminal justice system, the role of
the judge is essentially passive. In an adversarial system like ours, the parties initiate the
case and direct its progress, including its possible disposition as a plea bargain. The
judge’s role is limited to reviewing the bargain once it is presented. Many jurisdictions,
including the federal, expressly prohibit judges from participating in or commenting on
the plea negotiations.
Turner, supra note 18, at 199; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and
the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea
agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions.”); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3(a) (Supp. 1968) (“The trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.”);
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
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the government that, although the defense was willing to negotiate, it
believed that there was a high likelihood that an attack of the
preemptive nature of the prosecution would be successful in a second
trial.117 By posturing in this manner, the defense influenced the
government’s analysis of the case and, presumably, increased the
assessed outcome differential. Examining the unique barriers to
success at trial in the three terrorism cases described above, the below
model creates an estimate of the applicable sizes of the outcome
differentials for each.118

959, 971–72 (2009) (noting courts’ reluctance to interfere in the plea bargaining process or thwart
proposed bargains); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 39 (2002) (“The clearest effect of plea bargains on trial judges is to marginalize them. Judges
have little voice in traditional plea bargains.”). But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970);
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 678 (2009)
(noting that in Brady, the trial court informed the defendant that he thought the defendant might get the
death penalty, and, when the defendant indicated he would enter a plea of guilty, stated, “Well, I think
you are very wise, because I was certainly going to submit the death penalty to the jury.”).
As the judiciary plays almost no role during plea negotiations in the federal system and in
many state systems, this article will not specifically incorporate the role of judges into the model. Where
judges do engage in the plea bargaining process, however, the above model of plea bargaining is easily
expanded to account for their influence at various stages of the negotiation. For instance, where a judge
indicates to a defendant during a preliminary hearing that it would be in his or her best interest to plead
guilty, this would impact both the defendant’s and the prosecution’s assessment of the case and,
therefore, the applicable outcome differential. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 n.11 (2002) (noting that an interesting feature
of the New Orleans criminal justice system is the involvement of judges in plea bargaining, including
sometimes negotiating with defendants; an involvement the authors note may be a trend around the
country).
117. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
118. See Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
Estimated Outcome Differentials in the Three Terrorism Cases
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2. To Negotiate a Plea or Not
Once each party has conducted its evaluation of the outcome
differential, each must determine whether the case is one in which
they will either offer or entertain a plea offer. In most prosecutions,
the outcome differential is significant enough to encourage the
government to offer some benefits to the defendant, even if fairly de
minimis, to create an incentive to plead guilty.119 This is due in part to
the reality that plea deals necessarily permit the government to
preserve resources that may then be utilized in other cases. For
instance, even in the Reid case, in which the outcome differential was
almost non-existent, the government offered the possibility of a
bargain in return for information and cooperation.120 By the same
token, the outcome differential is typically not so large as to convince
119. See Figure 3.
120. While there are very few instances in which the government would make no plea offer to the
defense, this possibility must be accounted for in the outcome differential theory. An example of a
situation in which the government might not deal is where the case is highly publicized and the
government intends to “send a message” through trial.
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a defendant not to entertain an offer from the government, as cases in
which the outcome differential is this large would likely never be
brought by the government or result in an indictment from a grand
jury.121 As this article has described, over 95% of federal
prosecutions result in a plea of guilty. Therefore, in most cases the
parties’ assessments of the outcome differential results in a decision
to engage in bargaining. Below is a model of the manner in which the
size of the outcome differential affects the likelihood that the
government will offer the defendant a bargain and that such offer will
be entertained by the defense.
FIGURE 3
Likelihood of Plea Negotiations
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Trial
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0
weak
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Bargaining
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The shaded area above represents the area in which the outcome
differential is significant enough to induce the government to make
an offer, but not so significant as to dissuade the defendant from
entertaining the proposal.

121. See Figure 3.
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3. Establishing and Distributing Available Benefits
Once the parties determine that negotiations will occur due to the
size of the outcome differential, the next part of the plea bargaining
process is a determination by each party of acceptable terms. As with
the calculation of the outcome differential, both the prosecution and
the defense play significant roles in this evaluation. While the
outcome differential calculation required analysis of all barriers to
success at trial, this portion of the analysis focuses on the barriers to
the success of the bargain itself. It is here that the institutional and
psychological barriers to plea bargaining affect the eventual offer
from the government and the final determination from the defendant
regarding whether to accept.
In the traditional shadow-of-trial plea bargaining theory, where the
likelihood of success at trial is the only consideration and a reduction
in sentence is the only incentive available from the government, one
could predict that the size of the outcome differential and the
sentencing differential would be similar. Therefore, where the
outcome differential is high, both parties’ assessments of the
appropriate and acceptable sentencing differential would also be
high.122 This direct relationship is demonstrated in the model
below.123

122. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 1237, 1243–44 (2008) (“Most commentators that have advocated reform of plea bargaining
have begun by criticizing the dramatic gap between plea and trial sentences. This differential,
alternatively referred to as the ‘plea discount’ or ‘trial penalty,’ depending on the perspective, is
indisputably the engine that drives the plea-bargaining machine.”).
123. See Figure 4.
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FIGURE 4
Relative Increases in Outcome Differential and Sentencing
Differential
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As illustrated in the model above, in a simplistic plea bargaining
system the outcome differential and the sentencing differential track
closely.
Plea bargaining in the American criminal justice system, however,
is a more complex endeavor. First, on a case-by-case basis the
prosecution may be required to offer a particular defendant a
sentencing differential that is higher than predicted based solely on
the case’s outcome differential. Examples include cases where a
defendant needs additional incentives to overcome a psychological
barrier to pleading guilty or where the government will seek
additional cooperation from the defendant after his or her conviction.
Second, the prosecution may agree to hold back certain charges or
prosecutorial options in return for a guilty plea. When such benefits
are offered, the corresponding sentencing differential relating to the
charges actually brought need not be as large to induce a defendant to
accept the bargain. Finally, sentencing considerations are not the only
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benefits defendants seek. Rather, defendants are often interested in
other non-sentencing rewards, even if receipt of these benefits might
result in a less significant sentencing differential. Because of these
additional exchanges of benefits between each side of the bargain, the
actual sentencing differential in each case may vary widely from that
which would be predicted through examination of the outcome
differential alone.124
To account for the impact of the exchange of additional benefits
described above and more accurately predict the impact of such
exchanges on sentencing, an intermediary step must be added to plea
bargaining models. This additional step reflects that the outcome
differential is not directly related to the eventual sentencing
differential but instead to the calculation of the appropriate pool of
benefits available to the defendant in return for pleading guilty.
Where the defendant’s chances of success at trial are high, the initial
pool of available benefits will be high. Similarly, where the
defendant’s chances of success at trial are low, the initial pool of
available benefits will also be low. Below is a model of the initial
pools of benefits in the three terrorism cases described herein.125

124. Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government Promises: A Contract-Based Approach to Enforcing
Plea Bargains, 38 N.M.L. REV. 159, 159 (2008) (“Plea agreements take numerous forms and often
involve many different types of concessions by both the government and the defendant.”).
125. See Figure 5.

284

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:2

FIGURE 5
Pool of Initial Available Benefits in Each Terrorism Case
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As discussed above, the initial pool of benefits available to
defendants based on their outcome differential may then increase or
decrease in size depending on several considerations. First, the
government may increase a defendant’s available pool of benefits to
overcome barriers to the success of the plea offer.126 Therefore,
where a defendant is overconfident, this factor might not influence
the outcome differential because it is not a barrier to the
government’s success at trial but might be a barrier to the success of
the plea bargain itself.127 As such, the government might offer the
126. See Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2496–2527 (discussing psychological barriers to
plea bargaining).
127. There are many reasons a defendant might be ‘overconfident.’ One such reason is a belief by the
defendant, whether true or imaginary, that he is innocent of the charged conduct. See Covey, supra note
37, at 130 (“Plea bargaining’s pricing model misprices pleas in part because it fails to incorporate a
critically important piece of information—the defendant’s subjective knowledge of guilt or innocence—
into the pricing mechanism.”). Another such reason might be that a defendant has no prior criminal
convictions and, therefore, is more reluctant than a recidivist to accept a bargain that requires the
establishment of a criminal record. See Wright, supra note 113 at 70 (“While recidivists do account for a
large number of the bodies in the criminal court system, it would be a mistake to ignore the large group
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defendant an increase in the relative size of the available pool of
benefits in exchange for the defendant abandoning this trait.128
Second, the government may request additional benefits from the
defendant beyond a willingness to plead guilty, such as an agreement
to cooperate in future investigations or prosecutions.129 In such cases,
the defendant’s available pool of benefits increases in size in return
for the defendant’s agreement to satisfy the government’s additional
request. Where the government agrees to increase a defendant’s
available pool of benefits, as described above, the resulting impact is
demonstrated below.130

of defendants who have no prior convictions. . . . [B]ecause the fact of convictions should concern these
defendants more than the amount of punishment, they are more likely to hold out for a dismissal or an
acquittal in a weak case.”). Consideration of such barriers to the success of plea bargains and their
relative impact on the eventual sentencing differentials necessary to induce bargains is absent from the
traditional shadow-of-trial formulas but are a central consideration in the benefit distribution theory.
128. It is important to understand that certain factors have broad implications and the potential to
influence various aspects of the plea bargaining process. In fact, some factors, such as wealth, might
impact both the assessment of the likelihood of success at trial and the evaluation of the actual plea
agreement because they impact both structural and psychological influences. For instance, if a defendant
is wealthy, he may have a stronger defense team, which would be a structural factor influencing the
assessment of success at trial. At the same time, wealth and a strong defense team might encourage a
defendant to be more risk averse, a psychological barrier to success of the plea bargain itself. As such,
wealth might both increase the outcome differential and result in an increase in the relative size of the
available pool of benefits to create a greater incentive for the defendant to plead guilty. See Bibas,
Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2465–66.
129. See Cicchini, supra note 124, at 162 (“In many cases, defendants provide information that results
in convictions for far more serious criminal behavior of co-actors, or even of individuals in unrelated
cases. In short, the benefits flowing to the government from the plea bargaining system are numerous,
far reaching, and incredibly valuable.”).
130. See Figure 6.
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FIGURE 6
Impact of Prosecution Increasing Available Pool of Benefits
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Third, just as the prosecution may act in a manner that increases
the defendant’s available pool of benefits, the government may also
act to diminish these available benefits. Most commonly, such
diminutions occur where the prosecution has agreed to charge
bargaining and will not utilize readily provable conduct to bring more
severe charges or to apply harsher statutes, including statutes carrying
mandatory minimum sentences. Obviously, where the prosecution
agrees to forgo more serious charges in return for a guilty plea, it will
not be necessary to also offer the defendant a significant pool of
benefits for application when being sentenced for the conduct and
charges actually contained in the plea agreement.131 As a result, a
131. See James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, 1 J. OF
LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 130 (2009) (“[P]rosecutors make use of their charging discretion to engage in
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defendant with a relatively large outcome differential may still have a
small pool of available benefits for application at sentencing because
the pool of available benefits has been significantly drained in return
for the prosecution’s agreement not to bring additional or more
aggressive charges.
Once the size of the defendant’s available pool of benefits has been
altered based on barriers to the success of the plea bargain, including
considerations of benefits desired by the government beyond a mere
plea of guilty and any agreements from the government regarding
uncharged or under-charged conduct, the defendant’s role in the
process once again becomes vital. At this stage of the negotiation, the
defendant is able to influence the use of the remaining pool of
benefits between sentencing and non-sentencing considerations. If the
defendant seeks only to utilize the benefits pool to influence
sentencing, the resulting sentencing differential will be relative in
size to the total size of the available pool of benefits. However, if the
defendant seeks other non-sentencing benefits, such as a
recommendation regarding a particular prison or category of criminal
offense for reasons related to social stigma, the applicable pool of
benefits shrinks, resulting in a related diminution in the size of the
eventual sentencing differential. This occurs because the defendant
cannot increase the size of the available pool of benefits, and any
specific requests, whether sentencing or non-sentencing, necessarily
reduce the size of the remaining pool.132

‘charge bargaining’—plea bargaining with the accused in which the prosecutor offers a lighter sentence
in return for a plea of guilty to a lesser charge.”); Wright & Miller, supra note 29, at 1414 (“The same
set of facts can sustain various charges with varying penalties.”); Lynch, supra note 30, at 2132 (“There
is, to be sure, an element of trading involved: the defendant does have an expensive set of procedural
rights that can be invoked, and so always has at least something—the certainty and ease of a conviction
that will not need to be processed through the adversarial judicial process—to trade to the prosecutor for
a reduced charge.”).
132. See Figure 7.
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FIGURE 7
Influences of Defense Receiving Non-Sentencing Benefits
on Remaining Available Pool of Benefits to Influence
Sentencing Differential
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The three terrorism cases discussed in this article illustrate the
manner in which the government may increase the available pool of
benefits in return for additional concessions or cooperation; the
manner in which the government may diminish the available pool of
benefits in return for foregoing more aggressive charging; and the
manner in which the defendant may influence the utilization of the
final available pool of benefits. For instance, Reid was offered a more
lenient sentence by the government in return for cooperation in
ongoing terrorism investigations.133 Although Reid declined the offer,
it demonstrates the government’s willingness to exchange
cooperation for an increase in Reid’s available pool of benefits.134
Had Reid accepted this offer, his sentencing differential would have
133. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
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grown larger than that originally predicted by the outcome
differential in his case. In the Lodi case, Hayat refused to plead guilty
to a terrorism related charge.135 Although this decision did not play a
significant role in his eventual sentence for a customs violation
because he received a sentence of time served, it illustrates Hayat’s
willingness to utilize some of his available pool of benefits in return
for not being charged with an offense that carried a significant
stigma.136 As a result, the remaining pool of benefits available to
influence Hayat’s sentencing differential shrunk. Importantly, this
decision was made by Hayat and illustrates once again that
defendants do play a significant role in the plea bargaining machine.
Finally, in the Lackawanna case, there is evidence that the defendants
pleaded guilty, in part, in return for the government dropping
conspiracy charges and because of concerns that the government
would file even more serious charges if the case proceeded to trial.137
There is also evidence that the government threatened to classify the
defendants as enemy combatants if the cases did not settle at the plea
bargaining stage.138 This is an example of the government reducing
the relative size of the defendants’ available pool of benefits in return
for an agreement not to bring more serious charges and, in a manner
unique to terrorism cases, not labeling the defendants as enemy
combatants. Such charging and classification concessions from the
government certainly had a significant impact on the individuals’
final sentences and aid in explaining why the final sentencing
differentials in these cases were not reflective of the initial
assessment of the government’s likelihood of success at trial.

135. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
136. Tempest & Bailey, supra note 76, at B7.
137. New York Man Admits to Attending al Qaeda Training Camp, supra note 102 (“[Mr. Goba’s
lawyer said] his client had agreed to the plea deal . . . because of the possibility that the government
could bring more serious charges, like treason.”).
138. Eric Lichtblau, supra note 98 (“Mr. Brown said his client had decided to plead guilty after
prosecutors suggested that Mr. Mosed could be declared an enemy combatant and be held indefinitely
without a lawyer, or be charged with treason and face execution.”); see Carl Takei, Terrorizing Justice:
An Argument that Plea Bargains Struck Under the Threat of “Enemy Combatant” Detention Violate the
Right to Due Process, 47 B.C. L. REV. 581, 584 (2006) (“When a prosecutor uses the threat of enemy
combatant detention as leverage in a criminal case, the threat creates extraordinary pressure to plead
guilty.”).
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4. The Final Administrative Determination
Once the first phase of the plea bargaining process is complete and
the prosecution and defense have determined the applicable outcome
differential, calculated the size of the defendant’s available pool of
benefits, and determined how the benefits will be distributed between
sentencing and non-sentencing related benefits, the second phase
begins, which is the administrative phase.
The administrative phase is a byproduct of the exhaustive first
phase of the bargain and represents the government’s unilateral
decision regarding the final offer that will be presented to the
defendant. While the administrative theory of plea bargaining is
correct that the government wields significant power during this
phase and defendants often accept the government’s final
determination of a just result, these acts must be considered in the
context of the earlier role of the defense. Prior to the government
shifting into its administrative role, the defendant influenced the
prosecution’s determination regarding the strength of the case, the
factors influencing the success of a plea offer, and the manner in
which the offer would distribute benefits between sentencing and
non-sentencing considerations. As such, the defendant’s influence in
the second phase, though indirect, is significant.
Furthermore, consideration must be given to the success of such
offers by the government. Over 95% of defendants in the federal
system plead guilty, most as part of a bargain with the government.
While the administrative theory of plea bargaining argues that many
of these defendants are forced to unwillingly accept the government’s
offer, this appears to overly diminish the defendant’s true role in the
plea bargaining process. Given the extensive role of the defendant in
the first phase of the bargain, it is more likely that plea bargaining
rates are high because most of the offers are considered reasonable by
both parties, each having performed the analysis described above in
phase one. Though it may be true that many defendants still feel a
sense of despair at agreeing to the ultimate determination, for close to
95% of defendants the offer is significant enough to create an
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incentive to plead guilty.139 As such, the fact that the government
controls this final phase of the process should not be interpreted to
mean that defendants play no role in the operation of the plea
bargaining machine; just as the fact that defendants control the
ultimate decision whether to accept an offer or move forward to trial
should not be interpreted to mean that the government is a mere
bystander in the process as a whole.
B. Unilateral Plea Bargaining
Regardless of whether bilateral plea negotiations occur, an
important aspect of any guilty plea is consideration of the benefits
associated with unilateral plea bargaining between the defendant and
the criminal justice system. Under the theory of unilateral plea
bargaining, defendants sometimes trade their right to a trial in return
for the inherent benefits of pleading guilty. These inherent benefits
are bestowed by the system and may encourage a plea of guilty
regardless of whether the defendant is also entertaining an offer from
the government.140
139. The significance of defense counsel in the plea bargaining process must not be overlooked.
Defense counsel plays a significant role in the parties’ assessments of the likelihood of success at trial
and the evaluation of barriers to the success of the plea negotiations. Beyond this, defense counsel also
serves as a guide for the defendant, assisting him or her in navigating the process, voicing the
defendant’s positions, concerns, and desired distribution of benefits, and helping the defendant analyze
and consider the available alternatives. As such, a poor defense attorney might act as an additional
barrier to the success of the plea bargain itself, should he or she fail to properly counsel the defendant
regarding the risks and realities of the criminal process. Alschuler, supra note 116, at 680 (“The practice
of plea bargaining often transforms criminal defense attorneys from courtroom champions into the point
men and women of a coercive system. The principle function of counsel is to explain to their clients just
how the legal system’s armaments work and to force these clients to recognize the coercive power of the
alternatives they face.”).
140. One form of unilateral plea bargaining not discussed at length in this article occurs when an
individual confesses to the charged conduct to demonstrate a commitment to the ideology that inspired
his or her acts. An example of this type of defendant is “Times Square Bomber” Faisal Shahzad, who
attempted to detonate an S.U.V. full of explosives in New York’s Times Square on May 1, 2010.
Shahzad entered a plea of guilty to terrorism charges in June 2010 and stated, “I want to plead guilty,
and I’m going to plead guilty 100 times over.” Benjamin Weiser & Colin Moynihan, A Guilty Plea in
Plot to Bomb Times Square, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A1. Shahzad went on to state, “I am part of
the answer to the U.S. terrorizing the Muslim nations and the Muslim people.” Scott Shane, Wars
Fought and Wars Googled, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at WK1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/weekinreview/27shane.html. While Shahzad’s decision to plead
guilty is interesting, it adds little to our understanding of the plea bargaining machine or the motivations
that encourage a large majority of terrorism defendants to select plea bargaining over trial. This is
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1. Stigma and Plea Bargaining
While a thorough examination of all of the inherent benefits of
pleading guilty is outside the scope of this article, there are three such
benefits for consideration in the terrorism cases discussed above.
First, and almost entirely overlooked in existing plea bargaining
literature, is consideration of stigma. Stigma is an “external incentive
founded on the reluctance of individuals to interact with a person
who breaches social norms.”141 While all manner of criminal
behavior creates varying levels of stigma, being labeled a “terrorist”
is perhaps one of the most stigmatizing.142 Although stigma is most
closely linked to the actual perpetrator of the crime, family members
can also suffer from its adverse affects.143 As one commentator noted,
because Shahzad could have achieved the same result by going to trial. Recall that in 2006, Zacarias
Moussaoui proceeded to trial and then used the stand as a mechanism to boast of his involvement in the
9/11 plot. Lewis, supra note 50. As such, Shahzad’s decision to plead guilty appears to say less about
the plea bargaining machine and more about his own forum preferences for asserting his allegiance to
terrorism. Further, it may in fact be the case that Shahzad is actually motivated by one of the unilateral
plea bargaining considerations discussed at length in this piece, but, unlike Richard Reid and others, he
has chosen to mask his true motivations.
141. Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May
Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 362 (2007) (“[S]tigma operates by limiting and
constraining both social and commercial opportunities. These constraints are the by-product of the
willingness of individual—private enforcers—to punish the perpetrators of crime by limiting social or
professional interactions with them.”); see also ANTON J. M. DIJKER & WILLEM KOOMEN,
STIGMATIZATION, TOLERANCE AND REPAIR: AN INTEGRATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF
RESPONSES TO DEVIANCE 6 (2007) (“Stigmatization is a type of social control that does not distinguish
between a person and his or her deviant behavior or temporary condition, that is aimed at excluding the
person from a relationship or society.”).
142. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention,
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 131 (2009) (“The stigma attached to an individual who is thought of as a
potential terrorist is, needless to say, extremely high. Indeed, to be mistakenly identified as a suspected
terrorist would be a nightmare of extraordinary proportions.”) (quoting Justin Florence, Note, Making
the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watch Lists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2153 (2006)).
143. See Farkas & Miller, supra note 58, at 90 (“A ‘courtesy stigma’ is attached to families, which
results in their social marginalization, even though they did not commit a sex offense. For many family
members, their identities as spouses, parents, siblings, and children are suspended while they try to
negotiate their daily lives.”). See generally SOCIAL WORK AND DISADVANTAGE: ADDRESSING THE
ROOTS OF STIGMA THROUGH ASSOCIATION (Peter Burke & Jonathan Parker eds., 2007) (discussing
stigma by association); Sally Mason, et al., Developing a Measure of Stigma by Association with African
American Adolescents Whose Mothers Have HIV, 20 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 65 (2010) (discussing
familial stigma suffered by those whose family members have HIV); Cristina Parfene, et al., Epilepsy
Stigma and Stigma by Association in the Workplace, 15 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 461 (2009) (discussing
stigma by association); P. Werner & J. Heinik, Stigma by Association and Alzheimer’s Disease, 12
AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 92 (2008) (examining stigma by association with regard to Alzheimer’s
disease); Patrick W. Corrigan, et al., Blame, Shame, and Contamination: The Impact of Mental Illness
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“Family members [of offenders] report being ostracized and
disrespected by neighbors, lifetime acquaintances, and relatives
because of their . . . offender connections. They feel constantly
watched by neighbors and others in the community.”144 As another
commentator stated, “[B]ecause the offender has committed an act
which is socially unacceptable, his family members are often thought
of as criminals, too.”145 Further, although scholarship on stigma and
criminal law has focused on the deterrent force of the concept, it is
equally true that stigma can be motivational.146 In the case of Reid,
the possibility that reference to al Qaeda might be removed from his
indictment and the ability to avoid a trial, both of which he believed
would reduce the stigma suffered by his family as a result of his
actions, created an incentive for him to plead guilty.147 While the
benefit of avoiding familial stigma will rarely be a sufficient
incentive for a defendant to plead guilty where the government’s case
is less than assured, where the defendant’s conviction is highly likely
at trial, preventing the pain and lasting negative consequences of an
internationally publicized spectacle might well be enough to result in
and Drug Dependence Stigma on Family Members, 20 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 239 (2006) (examining stigma
associated with family members suffering from mental illness and drug dependence); Susan B.
Goldstein & Vera A. Johnson, Stigma by Association: Perceptions of the Dating Partners of College
Students with Physical Disabilities, 19 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 495 (1997) (discussing
associational stigma related to interaction with individuals with disabilities).
144. Farkas & Miller, supra note 58, at 90; see also Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of I. Lewis
Libby in U.S. v. Libby, CR. NO. 05-394 (RBW), 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 33, 42 (2007) (“The public
nature of Mr. Libby’s indictment, trial, and conviction will ensure that he and his family carry the stigma
of those convictions forever. The impact of Mr. Libby’s convictions, on himself and his family, is
profound and devastating. It will continue to be so, regardless of the sentence this Court chooses to
impose.”).
145. Susan H. Fishman, Losing a Loved One to Incarceration: The Effect of Imprisonment on Family
Members, 59 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 372, 373 (1981); see also RACHEL CONDRY, FAMILIES
SHAMED: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FOR RELATIVES OF SERIOUS OFFENDERS 61–93 (2007)
(discussing secondary stigma). Condry states:
In our society . . . the ties that bind kin together are strong enough for dishonour to flow
from the actions of one relative to another, and for a family to have a reputation which
can be damaged by the actions of one member. When those actions comprise some of the
most grave and vilified crimes in our society, the whole family can be tainted with the
resulting stigma.
Id. at 61–62.
146. Rasmusen, supra note 107, at 540 (1996) (“Once the criminal’s behavior becomes known, other
individuals become more reluctant to interact with him. This private reluctance may be as powerful a
disincentive to crime as public punishment.”).
147. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
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a plea of guilty. For Reid, this benefit was enough, and he accepted
the deal.148
2. The Financial and Psychological Costs of Trial
Second, defendants are often motivated to plead guilty by
consideration of the financial and psychological costs of trial on both
themselves and their families.149 While it may be desirable to
exercise one’s right to trial in hopes of exoneration, the collateral
costs of selecting this course are often untenable. Consider the
choices made by Umer Hayat in the Lodi case. Hayat indicated that
he pleaded guilty because of the incentives offered by the
government and the reality that a plea bargain would spare himself
and his family the costs of a second trial.150 As with considerations of
stigma, defendants’ decisions to spare themselves and their families
the financial and psychological costs of trial are not properly
categorized as benefits granted by the prosecution. More accurately,
these are benefits inherent to the plea bargaining system and offered
in each case where the defendant embraces the option of pleading
guilty. Furthermore, it is important to observe that in the Hayat
matter, as opposed to the Reid case, the defendant was motivated to
plead guilty by a combination of benefits offered by the prosecution
and benefits inherent to the system.151
148. Id. (discussing Richard Reid’s decision to plead guilty).
149. See Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 260, 261 (2009),
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/response/05-2009/Bowers.pdf (“[O]nce an innocent defendant
is arrested and charged wrongfully, the costs of proceeding to an imperfect trail often swamp the costs of
pleading to lenient bargains.”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 728 (2008) (“A grand jury must determine whether sufficient evidence exists
to justify a trial, and an affirmative decision will subject a criminal defendant to the economic, personal,
reputational, and psychological costs of standing trial and defending against the indictment’s charges.”);
O’Hear, supra note 31, at 418–19 (“Prosecutors can act in a high-handed way because few defendants
can afford to go to trial. The costs of trial extend far beyond the litigation expenses. . . . For those who
secure pretrial release, there will be a desire to draw tedious, inconvenient, and sometimes humiliating
court appearances to an end.”).
150. See supra Part II.B (discussing Umer Hayat’s motivation for pleading guilty).
151. The Reid case and the Hayat case demonstrate the manner in which bilateral and unilateral plea
bargaining can either operate independently or in tandem during a case. While some defendants, such as
Reid, will find the benefits of unilateral plea bargaining sufficient in and of themselves to give up their
right to trial, other defendants, such as Hayat, will only acquiesce to the plea bargaining machine in
return for the combined benefits of each. Further, other defendants may not be interested in the benefits
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3. Additional Institutional Benefits
Finally, in determining whether to plead guilty, a defendant might
also consider the credit received under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility or other institutional
advantages not controlled by the prosecution, such as currying favor
with the judge regarding a requested prison assignment. For example,
under the federal sentencing guidelines, a defendant who is
determined by the court to have “accepted responsibility” is eligible
for a reduction in their offense level of two points, even where the
government objects.152 Importantly, in the comments, the guidelines
state the following regarding guilty pleas:
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts
the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the
essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then
admits guilt and expresses remorse. . . . Entry of a plea of guilty
prior to the commencement of trial combined with truthfully
admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and
truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional
relevant conduct for which he is accountable under § 1B1.3 . . . ,
will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of
153
responsibility for the purposes of subsection (a).

Where defendants become eligible for a reduction in their offense
level because they have pleaded guilty, the eventual sentencing
benefits may be significant, even without additional benefits from the
government. For instance, defendants charged with conduct resulting
in an offense level of nine will face a minimum of four months in
inherent to pleading guilty, and will find motivation only in the benefits being offered by the
government.
152. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2009). Where the government supports a
defendant’s receipt of credit for acceptance of responsibility, the defendant may be eligible for an
additional point reduction. Id. § 3E1.1(b).
153. Id. § 3E1.1, comments 2–3 (2009); see also Sentencing, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
681, 698–99 (2009) (“Reductions based on defendants’ acceptance of responsibility have withstood
challenges that they violate defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Fifth
Amendment right to due process, and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.”).
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prison if convicted at trial, but may be sentenced to probation if they
receive credit for pleading guilty. Further, defendants charged with
conduct resulting in an offense level of forty-three will face a
mandatory sentence of life in prison. In return for a guilty plea,
however, the same defendants may be eligible for a sentence of just
twenty-seven years in prison. Although twenty-seven years is a
significant period of incarceration, for a defendant aged eighteen at
the time of conviction, this means the difference between release
when he or she is forty-five years old or spending the rest of his or
her natural life behind bars.154 The inherent benefits available under
the sentencing guidelines may not be sufficient to motivate all
defendants to plead guilty, but they may be sufficient for some, with
or without the offer of additional benefits from the government.
Although most of the above described considerations have
traditionally been considered outside the scope of the plea bargaining
machine, they should properly be included within any model of plea
bargaining as they can significantly impact a defendant’s decision
whether to plead guilty. Furthermore, while the government can
certainly bring these benefits to the attention of the defense, they
cannot control them, and, therefore, a defendant’s consideration of
unilateral plea bargaining benefits is once again an example of the
significant role played by defendants in the operation of the machine.
CONCLUSION
Two theories have dominated recent scholarship regarding the
operation of a system that leads to over 95% of defendants pleading
guilty. While the administrative theory argues that prosecutors have
become so powerful that they force defendants to accept plea
bargains in which they alone determine the appropriate punishment,
the shadow-of-trial theory contends that both prosecutors and
defendants participate in the plea bargaining process like a

154. This calculation includes consideration of “good time,” which permits a 15% reduction in a
federal inmate’s sentence for good behavior while in prison. Such “good time” does not apply to inmates
who are sentenced to terms of life in prison.

2011]

PLEA BARGAINING

297

contractual negotiation. As is so often the case, both appear to be
correct and represent different portions of the plea bargaining
process.
Plea bargaining is a much larger machine than many have
previously articulated, and, within this machine, there are two distinct
types of bargain. First, both the defense and the prosecution play
active roles in bilateral negotiations, each influencing the others’
determination until, at the end of the process, the government makes
its final administrative determination of a just result. This is not a
process where defendants are subjected to the whims of the
government without any voice or participation, but rather a complex
evaluation of the barriers to success at trial and the barriers to success
of the plea bargain itself. Plea bargaining has triumphed, therefore,
because the process effectively captures both parties' interests and
resolves the conflict in a manner appealing to all but a handful of
defendants. Second, defendants, even without engaging in bilateral
negotiations, may engage in unilateral bargaining and accept the
inherent benefits of pleading guilty. In this second type of bargain,
defendants assert themselves as independent actors, accepting the
rewards of pleading guilty even where the government exerts no
control. Regardless of whether defendants engage in bilateral
bargaining, unilateral bargaining, or both, they are an important and
vital aspect of the plea bargaining machine.
It is true that there are many factors, rational and irrational, known
and unknown, that influence the decisions in each case regarding
whether a plea bargain will be offered and whether it will be
accepted. The benefit distribution model of plea bargaining described
in this work is a first step towards compartmentalizing the inner
workings of the plea bargaining machine and isolating the stages at
which varying factors influence the ultimate decisions of the
government regarding the offer it will present and of the defendant
regarding whether to accept. Although much research remains to
delve into the inner reaches of the plea bargaining machine and
explore the operation of this process that captures 95% of defendants,
the benefit distribution model offers a mechanism through which to
conduct this future research. Plea bargaining is not a perfect system
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to resolve criminal cases, and it presents many areas for concern. The
initial steps to correcting its deficiencies, however, cannot come until
there is a better understanding of its operation. Through this and
future research, one can strive to better the criminal justice system in
the United States, a system which is, for all intents and purposes, the
plea bargaining machine itself.

